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ABSTRACT 
MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN  
THE POST-KYOTO WORLD:  
ANALYSIS OF TURKEY’S ACTION PLAN IN  
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM FRAMEWORK 
Akın Olçum, Gökçe  
Ph.D., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Erinç Yeldan 
 
July 2012 
  
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the economic impacts of 
Turkey’s environmental regulation based on emission trading schemes in the 
post-Kyoto world. The dissertation is composed of two main parts. The first 
part is dedicated to the methodology underlying the Multi-Region 
Environmental and Trade Policy Analysis (MR-ETPA) model, which is 
developed for simulating market-based environmental regulation policies in 
general equilibrium framework. In the second part, the MR-ETPA model is 
further used for simulating the potential emission trading schemes that 
Turkey considers to apply, i.e. unilateral nationwide trading and 
international trading of permits within the European Union Emission 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The results indicate that Turkey has economic 
gains under bilateral trading within the EU ETS in comparison to domestic 
trading schemes. The economic benefits of the European Union highly 
depend on the design of the Turkish emission trading scheme. While 
unilateral trading schemes result in economic gains for the European Union, 
the net effect under bilateral trading very much depends on the total cost 
burden that Turkey imposes on the individual sectors.  
Keywords: Climate mitigation policy, emission trading systems, computable 
general equilibrium models, Turkey, European Union   
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ÖZET 
KYOTO SONRASI MARKET TEMELLİ  
ÇEVRESEL REGÜLASYON UYGULAMALARI:  
GENEL DENGE MODELİ ÇERÇEVESİNDE  
TÜRKİYE’NİN EYLEM PLANININ ANALİZİ  
Akın Olçum, Gökçe 
Doktora, Ekonomi Bölümü  
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Erinç Yeldan 
 
Temmuz 2012  
 
Bu tezin amacı, Türkiye ekonomisi için Kyoto sonrası dönemde uygulanması 
planlanan emisyon ticaretine dayalı çevresel regülasyonların iktisadi 
etkilerini analiz etmektir. Tez iki ana kısımdan oluşmaktadır. İlk kısımda, 
genel denge sistematiğine dayalı olarak geliştirilmiş ve market temelli 
çevresel regülasyon politikalarını analiz etmekte kullanılan “Çok Ülkeli 
Çevresel ve Ticari Politikaların Analizi” (MR-ETPA) modelinin metodolojisi 
ele alınmaktadır. İkinci kısımda, MR-ETPA modeli kullanılarak Türkiye’nin 
Kyoto sonrası dönemde uygulamayı planladığı muhtemel emisyon ticareti 
modellerinin iktisadi analizleri yapılmaktadır. Bu modellerden başlıcaları 
yerel ölçekte emisyon ticareti uygulaması ile Avrupa Birliği Karbon Piyasası 
(EU ETS) ile entegre olmuş yerel emisyon piyasası uygulamalarıdır. 
Çalışmanın sonuçları, Türkiye’nin yerel ölçekli emisyon ticareti 
uygulamalarına kıyasla EU ETS’ye entegre olmuş yerel emisyon piyasası 
uygulamalarından daha fazla iktisadi kazanımları olacağını göstermektedir. 
Avrupa Birliği Türkiye’nin yerel ölçekli emisyon ticareti uygulamalarından 
mutlak iktisadi kazanımlar sağlarken, EU ETS ile entegrasyon altındaki 
iktisadi etkiler Türkiye’nin emisyon marketi kurgusuna bağlı olarak 
değişmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye’nin toplam kota uygulamalarının ve 
bunun sektörler arası ayrıştırılmasının Avrupa Birliği açısından önem 
taşıdığı görülmektedir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İklim değişikliği politikaları, emisyon ticareti sistemleri, 
hesaplanabilir genel denge modelleri, Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği   
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  CHAPTER 1
Introduction 
This dissertation intends to study the economic impacts of market-based 
mitigation policy alternatives of Turkish economy in its efforts to stabilize 
greenhouse gas emissions in the post-Kyoto period. The potential 
alternatives studied are national emission trading scheme under various 
market structures and direct linking of national emission market with the 
European Union emission trading market (EU ETS), as part of the 
negotiations for the full membership to the European Union (EU).  
This chapter continues with a brief introduction to the evolution of the 
need for studying these environmental policy issues and further outlines the 
structure of the dissertation.   
The Kyoto Protocol is the first official attempt to stabilize greenhouse gas 
emissions. The Protocol enforces industrialized countries1 to reduce their 
emissions by 5.2% relative to 1990 levels over the period 2008-2012 
                                               
1 These countries are known to be the Annex I countries and include EU-15 countries, 
Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Canada, United States, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, 
Croatia, Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus and Malta.  
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(UNFCCC 1998). Although some of the Annex I parties, i.e. Turkey2, United 
States, Belarus and Malta, have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol by the time it 
entered into force, it is so far the most comprehensive agreement for 
mitigation targets at international level.  
While global mitigation efforts have sped up the turn-around in 
developing sustainable mitigation policies, emission trading has become the 
most widely used market-based instrument. As of 2011, emission trading 
schemes (ETSs) reach a total market value of $148,881 million (World Bank 
2012). Among the operational ETS, the EU ETS is the largest scheme with 
the value of $147,848 million (World Bank 2012)3.  
As the Kyoto Protocol expires by the end of 2012, the nations have been 
negotiating on the post-Kyoto (post-2012) mitigation targets since the 13th 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC held in Bali in 2007. Ensuring the 
participation of both industrialized and developing nations to international 
mitigation efforts and cost effectiveness stay to be the biggest challenges in 
designing a future international mitigation action. In that regard, it is 
indispensible to have more widespread use of ETSs worldwide and direct 
linkages between these systems as they enhance the cost effectiveness and 
cooperation via burden sharing. The increasing number of existing and 
planned ETSs4 shows that linkage of these systems is to become a significant 
                                               
2 Upon Turkey’s request for its “special circumstances” as a developing market 
economy, Turkey was granted its exception from international mitigation activities in the 
Kyoto period (UNFCCC 2001). 
3 The other operational emission trading schemes are as follows: Norway, Iceland, 
Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, Tokyo, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the 
United States, Alberta, Canada.  
4 In post-2012 period, in addition to the existing ETSs, China, India, Republic of Korea, 
Japan, Mexico and Brazil have also been planning to adopt national ETS. 
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aspect of post-Kyoto mitigation policies. From that point of view, the EU 
ETS serves as a unique model as it involves a diverse set of sovereign 
nations. Furthermore, Europe’s vision to link the EU ETS with other 
compatible ETSs worldwide in the post-2012 period carries the EU ETS 
beyond being just a model but constitutes it as a global prototype.   
In the current conjuncture, Turkey has experienced rapid growth in its 
greenhouse gas emissions since 1990. As of 2009, the rate of increase in total 
emissions is 102% compared to the 1990 levels (IEA 2011a). As a member of 
OECD and a candidate country for the EU, sooner or later, Turkey will have 
to face the challenge of stabilizing its emissions while sustaining its carbon 
intense economic growth. With these incentives, Turkey has developed its 
national vision in mitigation policies and declared its environmental 
objectives in the National Climate Change Action Plan: 2011-2023 (Ministry 
of Environment and Urbanization 2011). The Action Plan strongly 
emphasizes the need for establishing the national ETS by 2015 and its 
integration with the international carbon markets. Meanwhile, the 
environment chapter in the EU enlargement process has opened, which 
urges Turkey to take necessary steps in order to comply with European 
Environmental Law, including the integration with the EU ETS.  
Despite the incentives in the political ground, there are quite a few 
challenges that both Turkey and the European Union faces in formalizing 
their post-2012 strategies for market-based environmental regulation. The 
lack of adequate economic analysis also makes it even harder to resolve 
these challenges. In that regard, one of the main contributions of this 
dissertation to the environmental economics literature is that this study is 
unique in its novelty and scope to analyze the unilateral use of market-based 
instruments in Turkey as part of its contribution to the international 
mitigation efforts in the post-Kyoto period. Secondly, this study is also the 
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first to explore the environmental and economic impacts of linkage 
provisions of permit markets on both the EU and Turkey as part of the EU’s 
enlargement policies in post-2012 period.  
Within that perspective, CHAPTER 2 starts with a brief introduction to 
the theory of market-based instruments. The evolution of European and 
Turkish economies in the Kyoto period are investigated. Post-2012 
mitigation alternatives for both the EU and Turkey are given with a 
discussion on the relevant literature.  
CHAPTER 3 continues with the modeling framework and algebraic 
structure of the Multi-Region Environmental and Trade Policy Analysis 
(MR-ETPA) model, which is the other contribution of this dissertation to the 
economic literature. The MR-ETPA model is a multi-country, multi-sector 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that I developed for various 
environmental and trade policy analysis. As its theoretical underpinnings, 
the model has Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium framework. The 
underlying optimization framework increases the model’s reliability and 
relevance for the policy analysis since the outcome of a policy simulation 
can be traced back to rational behavior. General equilibrium framework 
with multi-country setting further enhances the ability of the model in 
quantifying the direct and indirect economic costs of environmental 
policies. Direct costs arise as a result of internalizing environmental 
externalities. The associated indirect costs occur due to the feedback effects 
as a result of changes in international competitiveness and pre-existing 
market distortions. Unlike the classical emission trading models, in the MR-
ETPA model, permit trading is not modeled via explicit analysis over 
marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves of the traders. Instead, MAC curves 
are formulated as functions of all price levels prevailing in both domestic 
and world markets and permit price is implicitly calculated as the point 
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where MACs are equalized across all emitters. This approach gives the MR-
ETPA model the advantage to have a robust representation of permit 
trading markets over the classical emission trading models. Hence, the 
permit market outcomes, i.e., permit price, allocation of permits and 
aggregate costs of abatement are assured to be robust against changes in 
environmental and economic policies. Furthermore, with this approach, the 
MR-ETPA model is also capable of capturing the carbon leakage effects, 
which cannot be captured by the classical emission trading models.  
The model calibration to a certain benchmark economy is discussed in 
CHAPTER 4. The discussion starts with a brief overview of the GTAP 7 data 
set and how it is aggregated and modified in order to make it compatible 
with the MR-ETPA model and the current policy questions. Finally, an 
overview on country profiles at benchmark economy is given.  
CHAPTER 5 starts with the discussion on the need for choosing a 
potential target year for mitigation policies and setting up a Business-As-
Usual scenario for each economy according to the target year. Following 
that, the forward calibration technique used for constructing the Business-
As-Usual economies, i.e. future economies under no mitigation targets, is 
introduced. This chapter continues with the description of policy scenarios. 
The main attention in the design of policy scenarios is given to the overall 
mitigation target and to the structure of the permit trading market. 
CHAPTER 5 concludes with the discussion on the economic impacts of the 
simulated policy scenarios.   
CHAPTER 6 concludes with the overall comments and discussion on the 
possible further research questions and, accordingly, on the necessary 
extensions of the MR-ETPA model. The supplementary materials for model 
calibration are given in appendices. 
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  CHAPTER 2
Market-Based Environmental Regulation 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the use of market-based instruments in regulating 
carbon dioxide emissions5 with a special focus on the applications in the 
European Union and Turkey.  
Section 2.2 provides a brief introduction to the theory of market-based 
instruments in their use for internalizing the environmental externalities. 
Two main categories are defined, i.e. price and quantity mechanisms. The 
potential advantages and disadvantages of these instruments are further 
discussed.  
Section 2.3 analyzes the use of cap-and-trade system as a market-based 
instrument in the European Union. The development of the European Union 
Emission Trading System (EU ETS) is analyzed in two parts: in Kyoto world 
                                               
5 Throughout this work, the general focus is on policies for curbing carbon dioxide 
emissions from fossil fuel use. Yet, the current context is also applicable to the regulation of 
other greenhouse gas emissions.  
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and in post-Kyoto world. The evolution of the European economy under 
carbon dioxide abatement is further analyzed with the statistics.  
Section 2.4 starts with the overview of the evolution of Turkish economy 
under no mitigation targets in Kyoto world. Then, the alternative market-
based instruments that Turkey is considering to apply as part of its national 
climate change strategy in post-Kyoto world are stated. With the help of the 
existing literature, the pros and cons of these instruments are discussed.  
Section 2.5 talks about the longer term perspectives on the use of market-
based regulations in the European Union and in Turkey. The theoretical 
discussions on the advantages and disadvantages of linking are given. The 
potential options for linking are discussed with the help of existing 
literature.   
Section 2.6 briefly summarizes and explains how this work fits in the 
economic literature in search for the needs of current environmental policy 
agenda of the European Union and also Turkey.  
2.2. Market-based Instruments 
Market-based instruments are kind of policy instruments which are widely 
used in internalizing environmental externalities, i.e. CO2 emissions. 
Theoretically, these instruments work to equate marginal benefit out of an 
environmental policy and marginal cost (Baumol & Oates 1988).  
It is common to compare the performances of these instruments in 
terms of cost and dynamic efficiencies and also environmental 
effectiveness. Cost efficiency is defined as the ability of the instrument to 
reach the environmental target at the lowest possible cost. In case of 
abatement policies, equalization of marginal abatement costs across 
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emitters assures cost efficiency (Perman et al. 1996). Environmental 
effectiveness is the ability of the instrument in meeting the target level of 
emissions. Dynamic efficiency is used as a measure for the spillover effects, 
such as technological change and economic development.  
Market-based instruments can be classified into two broad categories: 
price instruments and quantity instruments. A price mechanism is basically 
to impose a Pigouvian tax on the source of the negative externality (Pigou 
1960). In the context of CO2 emissions, this translates into a carbon tax which 
charges CO2 emitters a fixed fee for every ton of CO2 emitted. This fee can 
either be levied directly on fossil fuel producers or on fossil fuel consumers. 
Price mechanisms give different incentives to each emitter. The ones who 
cannot reduce emissions at a lower cost than the fixed fee are better off 
paying the charge for every ton of emission they create. On the other hand, 
emitters who can reduce emissions at a cost lower than the fixed fee are 
better of reducing their emissions. In that regard, price mechanisms are cost-
effective as the total abatement is guaranteed to be taken at the lowest 
possible cost.  
 A quantity mechanism works on the basis of tradable permits and 
usually referred to as a permit or a cap-and-trade system (Dales 1968). The 
rationale underlying cap-and-trade systems is that lack of well defined 
property rights causes externalities (Coase 1960). Thus, property rights of 
emitters are clearly defined simply by allocating permits, i.e. rights to emit, 
to each emitter. In a cap-and-trade system, total number of permits is limited 
by CO2 quotas and emitters are obliged to hold a permit for each ton of CO2 
they emit. Just like the price mechanism, the requirement to hold permits can be 
imposed either on the users of fossil fuels or on the producers of fossil fuels. In 
case of CO2 emissions, it is common to require fuel producers to hold permits, 
since CO2 emissions can be accurately calculated from the total volume of fossil 
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fuels used. The basic advantage of quantity mechanism over price mechanism is 
that in a cap-and-trade system emitters are also allowed to buy and sell permits 
in order to get the lowest abatement cost option for them. In the market place, 
the emitters that have cheaper mitigation options, i.e. low marginal abatement 
costs, will prefer to do so and sell the excess permits. Similarly, the emitters 
with high marginal cost of abatement will have the incentive not to mitigate but 
instead to buy permits in the market. Hence, total emissions will exactly match 
the total quota while assuring the cost-effectiveness.  
 When the marginal abatement costs are correctly estimated and not 
subject to any uncertainty, price and quantity mechanisms lead to the same 
cost efficient outcome (Montgomery 1972). A price mechanism leads to the 
cost efficient outcome by adjusting for the total level of emissions while 
keeping the price level fixed. A quantity mechanism leads to the cost 
efficient outcome by adjusting for the permit price while holding the 
emission levels constant. Hence, under certainty, both instruments can be 
used in exchange. Furthermore, Pezzey (1992) and Farrow (1995) proves the 
equivalence between an emission trading scheme, with auctioned permits, 
and levying a carbon tax at the auction price. Thus, the permit price is equal 
to the carbon tax under the same pollution target. However, under a given 
target level of pollution, carbon tax requires the aggregate marginal 
abatement cost curves to be determined beforehand in order to 
impose the correct tax rate. Thus, cap-and-trade systems have their major 
advantages in having control over total emissions without need for direct 
information regarding the marginal abatement cost structure at the 
aggregate level (Cropper & Oates 1992). 
In case of any uncertainty, the choice of the instrument should depend on 
the tradeoff between marginal benefits and costs. That is to say, if the 
damage increases severely with the level of pollution while the change in 
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abatement cost stays relatively more stable than that, then quantity 
mechanism should be preferred not to suffer too much from pollution. On 
the contrary, if the marginal damage changes slowly but the marginal cost 
increases severely, then it should be preferable to use price mechanisms not 
to risk high levels of mitigation cost for low levels of environmental benefits. 
Hence, as Jacoby and Ellerman (2002) states, the key element in choosing the 
appropriate instrument is the difference in how rapidly costs and benefits 
adjust when level of emission control changes.  
The use of tradable permits raises the question of how to allocate 
permits to the emitters. In that regard, there exist  two possibilities, 
which have been used so far: grandfathering, i.e. allocating permits for free 
based on historic emission levels and auctioning permits. For the sake of 
political acceptance of market-based instruments, grandfathering is seen 
as an advantage especially at the beginning (Tietenberg 2006). While it is 
shown that the initial allocation of permits does not affect the final allocation, 
auctioning has been the main choice of preference. Montgomery (1972) and 
Cramton and Kerr (2002) state the possible reasons to prefer auctioning 
over grandfathering as increased flexibility in distribution of abatement 
costs and also providing more incentives for innovation. Thinking in terms 
of the functioning of market, it should also be noted that auctioning 
improves the liquidity in the market as signaling a price level at the 
beginning of trading. 
2.3. Market-based Regulation in the European Union 
2.3.1. Kyoto world 
The Kyoto Protocol set binding emission targets for the EU 15 countries 
for the period 2008 and 2012. The overall EU emission target is stated as a 
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reduction of 8% compared to the emission level in 1990. Consequently, the 
EU member countries agreed on a burden-sharing arrangement, 
distributing the overall emission target to the member states (European 
Commission 2002). In meeting their mitigation targets, the European 
Union member countries have started to use cap-and-trade systems 
extensively. The European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) has 
become the largest cap-and-trade system in the world, which is used to 
regulate CO2 emissions.  
The EU ETS started with a learning phase (Phase I), which covered the 
period between 2005 and 2007. The system is now in its second phase of 
trading (Phase II) between 2008 and 2012, which is designed to coincide with 
the first commitment phase of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Phase I was implemented mainly to gain some experience and also to 
establish the necessary infrastructure for permit trading. Due to over 
allocation of allowances, permit prices in this first trading period converged 
to zero. The prices in the second “Kyoto” period have been relatively more 
stable. The allowances were traded at EUR 25 per ton for much of 2008, and 
in a range between EUR 13 per ton and EUR 16 per ton in the period 
between 2009 and 2011 (World Bank 2012). The amount of allowances traded 
in the EU ETS has been steadily increasing since 2005. In 2010, the amount is 
recorded as 6789 MtCO2eq of allowances at a market value of $134 billion. In 
2011, the number of traded allowances increases to 7853 MtCO2eq with a 
market value of $148 billion (World Bank 2012). 
The EU ETS regulates emissions from downstream entities. Thus, the 
liable entities to hold allowances in equal amounts to their emissions are 
defined to be the final users of dirty inputs, rather than the producers of 
dirty inputs. The emitters covered by the EU ETS are electricity generators, 
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oil refineries, coke ovens, ferrous metal production, steel industry, pulp and 
paper production, as well as cement production. Phase I and Phase II trading 
covered only CO2 emissions from ETS sectors, which amount to 45% of total 
CO2 emissions in the EU (IEA 2011a).  
In Phase I, 95% of total allowances were allocated for free to the liable 
entities. In the second phase, the ratio of grandfathered allowances has 
decreased to 90%.  
In order to reduce the compliance costs for participants, the EU Linking 
Directive (European Commission 2004) also allows offsets from credit 
systems to be used in the EU ETS market. These credit systems are defined to 
be the ones established by the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI).  
Table 2.1: Key indicators of the European Union 
EU 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009
%change 
90-09
CO2 
(Mt of CO2)
4051.9 3847.5 3831.2 3978.9 3941.9 3868.2 3576.8 -11.7%
TPES 
(Mtoe)
1348.5 1406.2 1487 1565.2 1538.6 1536.4 1459.1 8.2%
GDP PPP
(billion 2000 USD)
8556.4 9163.0 10591.8 11667.3 12445.5 12537.9 12007.6 40.2%
Population 
(millions)
472.9 478.7 482.9 492.1 496.4 498.7 500.4 5.8%
CO2/TPES 
(t CO2 per TJ)
59.1 56.1 54.3 53.4 53.6 52.8 51.6 -12.8%
CO2/GDP PPP 
(kg CO2 per 2000 USD)
0.47 0.42 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.3 -37.0%
CO2/population 
(t CO2 per capita)
8.57 8.04 7.93 8.09 7.94 7.76 7.15 -16.6%
 Source: IEA (2011a) 
Table 2.1 gives changes in some of the EU’s key environmental indicators. 
As of 2009, total CO2 emissions of the EU decreases to 3576.8 Mt of CO2. This 
decrease is quantified as 11.7% compared to the CO2 emission level in 1990. 
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It is worth noting that this reduction amount is already under the level set by 
the Kyoto Protocol.  
Within the period between 1990 and 2009, the GDP increases 40.2% from 
$8566.4 billion to $12007.6 billion. As the data reveals, there is a severe 
decline in GDP during 2009, which is due to the European Economic Crisis. 
Hence, some of the decline in CO2 emission level is also dependent on this 
negative scale effects. However, it is still a statistical fact that the EU has 
managed to decrease its level of emissions while having a certain level of 
economic growth. In the current context, this occurrence can be due to two 
main reasons. One is the increase in the ability to transform the carbon 
dependent economy to a greener economy. The other one is the ability to 
recycle the revenues from cap-and-trade systems in a way fostering 
economic growth in the long run. It is clear in Table 2.1 that some of the 
decrease in the overall CO2 emission level is attributed to the decrease in CO2 
intensity of the EU’s total primary energy supply (TPES). As renewable 
energy, i.e. hydro, solar, wind, bio-fuels and waste, has become more 
commonly used in the EU, the CO2/TPES ratio has also steadily declined 
from 59.1 tCO2 per TJ to 51.6 tCO2 per TJ. CO2 intensity of GDP also reveals 
this fact with a decline of 37% as of 2009, compared to the level in 1990. Thus, 
it is clear that the EU has managed to transform its economy to a greener 
economy in comparison to the past years. Taking into account the wide use 
of grandfathering during Phase I and II, much of the decrease in CO2 
intensity of the European economy should be attributed to the increasing use 
of renewable energy in total energy supply.   
2.3.2. Post-Kyoto world 
The EU has already committed itself to its post-Kyoto targets, the EU 20-
20-20 targets. The European Council has agreed upon a 20% share of 
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renewable energy sources in final energy consumption, 20% increase in 
energy efficiency and 20% decrease in its greenhouse gas emissions, 
compared to their 1990 levels, by 2020. In case of a comprehensive 
international agreement, the EU further confirmed its commitment to 
moving to a 30% reduction in its greenhouse gas emissions (European 
Commission 2008).  
The EU ETS, which is the cornerstone of the EU climate policy in curbing 
emissions, will enter its third phase (Phase III) from 2013 to 2020. According 
to the revision in the legislation, there will be some major changes in the 
third phase compared to the first and second trading periods. Firstly, 
auctioning will start to be used more extensively in the third period. Free 
allocation of allowances will gradually decline to 80% in 2013 and to 30% in 
2020. Full auctioning is supposed to be applied by 2027. Secondly, the EU 
ETS will start to cover all greenhouse gases from 2013 onwards, while it has 
covered only CO2 emissions in Phase I and II. Lastly, aviation and aluminum 
sectors will also be included in the EU ETS.  
For the post-Kyoto period, the EU’s climate policy undergoes highly 
significant changes in comparison with the past years. While the EU ETS 
market is kept as the central pillar in curbing emissions, the necessity of 
supporting that with certain levels of technological change is also included 
in the climate policy objectives. This kind of a policy structure can have 
different economic implications in the short run and in the long run. Within 
this framework, the EU backs the segmented market structure in permit 
trading and aims to use additional policy instruments to complement with 
the EU ETS, i.e. promotion of renewable energy use and increasing energy 
efficiency. Hence, potential side effects exist in the form of efficiency losses 
and excess abatement costs due to using different policy tools for the same 
environmental target. Tietenberg (2006) points out that potential loss in cost 
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effectiveness are likely to occur in case of any market segmentation. In 
addition to that, Tinbergen (1952) and Johnstone (2003) argue that using a 
mix of different policy instruments in achieving a total emission target can 
be redundant, at the worst case, leads to high levels of cost burden. 
Bohringer et al. (2009a) and Bohringer et al. (2009b) show in their 
comparative statics analysis within a general equilibrium framework that the 
use of second-best policies in achieving the EU 20-20-20 targets lead to 
considerable increase in cost compared to the comprehensive trading case. It 
is shown that two separate cap-and-trade systems EU wide, one for ETS 
sectors and one for non ETS sectors, increase compliance costs by 50%. 
Market structure with one ETS market and 27 separate non ETS markets in 
each member state increases the compliance costs by another 40%. The 
binding quota on the use of renewable energy also increases the compliance 
costs by around 90%. It should be noted that in these studies, the technical 
change and its potential effects in emissions in the long run are not taken 
into account while quantifying the costs of compliance. Hence, the validity of 
the results only holds for the short run.  
2.4. Market-based Regulation in Turkey 
2.4.1. Kyoto world 
When the UNFCCC was adopted in 1992, Turkey was initially included 
among Annex I and II countries. However, at the 7th Conference of Parties 
held in Marrakech in 2001, the UNFCCC parties agreed to the removal of 
Turkey from the Annex II list, upon Turkey’s request. Although listed in the 
Convention’s Annex I, since Turkey was not Party to the Convention when 
the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, Turkey was not in the Protocol’s Annex B 
list. Therefore, while the Protocol set binding emission targets for Annex B 
countries during the period between 2008 and 2012, Turkey has not had any 
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official emission reduction targets. Due to the lack of incentives for curbing 
emissions, Turkey has not made use of any of market-based instruments 
during the first commitment period of the Protocol.  
Table 2.2 summarizes how the Turkish economy evolved in the period 
over 1990 and 2009. Turkey’s GDP has shown a steady increase except for 
the year 2009 where the contraction in the economy was due to the global 
recession of the late 2000s. The rate of increase in GDP between 1990 and 
2009 is recorded as 92%. Following this considerable rise in GDP level, 
Turkey has also experienced a rapid increase in its total primary energy 
supply. The increase in TPES is reported as 85.1% between the years 1990 
and 2009.  
Table 2.2: Key indicators of Turkey 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009
%change 
90-09
CO2 
(Mt of CO2)
126.91 152.66 200.56 216.36 265 263.53 256.31 102.00%
TPES 
(Mtoe)
52.76 61.55 76.35 84.38 100.01 98.5 97.66 85.10%
GDP PPP
(billion 2000 USD)
411.06 481.43 589.24 736.17 823.66 829.09 789.08 92%
Population 
(millions)
55.12 59.76 64.26 68.58 70.26 71.08 71.9 30.40%
CO2/TPES 
(t CO2 per TJ)
57.5 59.2 62.7 61.2 63.3 63.9 62.7 9.10%
CO2/GDP PPP 
(kg CO2 per 2000 USD)
0.31 0.32 0.34 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.32 5.20%
CO2/population 
(t CO2 per capita)
2.3 2.55 3.12 3.15 3.77 3.71 3.57 54.80%
Source: IEA (2011a) 
As it is seen in Figure 2.1, total primary energy supply of Turkey highly 
depends on coal and peat with 32%, on natural gas with 30% and on crude 
oil and oil products with 27%. The figure gives the estimated balance in 
TPES for year 2010. Although Turkey’s energy supply policy has been 
changed in favor of natural gas in the late 1980s and the share of natural gas 
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in TPES has been rising steadily since then, the composition of TPES has 
been more stable starting with 2005. The share of renewable resources in 
TPES stays fairly low at 4% for hydro, 5% for bio-fuels and 2% for 
geothermal and solar resources. As coal, peat, oil and natural gas are energy 
sources which are rich in carbon contents, it is not surprising to see the 
highly significant rise in Turkey’s CO2 emissions between the period 1990 
and 2009. Turkey’s CO2 emissions increase from 126.91 Mt CO2 in 1990 to 
256.31 Mt CO2 in 2009, corresponding to a rise of 102%. Within the same 
period of time, the increase in CO2 emissions of OECD countries is 8%, while 
the European Union experiences a decline in total emission level at rate 
11.7%.  
In their quantitative studies, Lise (2006), Tunc et al. (2009) and 
Kumbaroglu (2011) try to unfold the effects underlying the increase in CO2 
emissions of Turkey. The potential effects are assumed to be scale effect, i.e. 
change in emissions due to changing activity levels, composition effect, i.e. 
change in emissions due to changes in the composition of sectors, energy-
intensity effect, i.e. change in emissions due to changes in the efficiencies of 
the energy processes and conversion technologies and carbon-intensity 
effect, i.e. change in emissions due to fuel substitution. As a result, it is seen 
that the largest portion of the increase in CO2 emissions is mainly due to the 
expansion of the economy (scale effect), which is further accompanied by the 
composition effect. Taking into account this fact, Telli et al. (2008) predicts 
that the increase in total CO2 emissions by 2020 will be 99% compared to the 
2009 levels.  
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Figure 2.1: Turkey’s estimated TPES Balance  
Source: IEA and OECD (2011) 
By 2009, with per capita CO2 emissions of 3.57 tones, Turkey lies below 
the OECD average of 9.83 tones and also the EU-27 average of 7.15 tones. 
However, it is crucial to note the difference in the movements of per capita 
CO2 emissions. While Turkey has been experiencing 54.8% growth in its per 
capita CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2009, OECD and the EU 27 countries 
experience severe declines in their per capita CO2 emissions, which are 
quantified around 6.2% and 16.6%, respectively.  
Turkey’s CO2 emissions per US$ GDP realizes as 0.32 for the year 2009, 
which is slightly below the OECD average of 0.38, however, higher than the 
EU-27 ratio of 0.30. This seems to be the constant trend since 2005. Just like 
the trends seen in per capita CO2 emissions, between 1990 and 2009, CO2 
emissions per US$ GDP also shows an increase around 5.2% in Turkey, and a 
decrease in both OECD and the EU 27 countries, around 28.2% and 37%, 
respectively. 
The differences in the above findings are mainly due to the differences in 
energy policies that regions pursue. It is clear that while Turkey is 
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experiencing emission intensive growth, due to its energy policies, OECD 
and the EU-27 countries, on average, pursue energy policies that are more 
reliant on less emission intensive inputs. This fact is also clearly reflected in 
the CO2/TPES ratios, in which the change between 1990 and 2009 is 
quantified as 9.1% for Turkey, -6.8% for OECD countries and -12.8% for the 
EU-27 countries.  
  IMF (2012) projects the annual growth rate of Turkish economy for 
the period between 2012 and 2017 as 3.7% on average, while IEA (2011b) 
projects it as 4.0% on average. Taking into account Turkey’s energy supply 
policies, in the long run, it is inevitable that Turkey will face rapid increase in 
its CO2 emissions in a way closing the gap in terms of CO2 emissions per 
capita and per US$ GDP with both OECD and the EU-27 countries.  
2.4.2. Post-Kyoto world 
As an EU candidate country and an OECD member country, Turkey has 
been under pressure to formalize its national action plan against curbing its 
CO2 emissions in the post-Kyoto period. In the latest progress report of 
European Commission, the need for a well defined emission reduction target 
and also the need for cooperation with the EU in emission trading is 
emphasized (European Commission 2011). In line with the European 
Commission’s report, the OECD Environmental Performance Review for 
Turkey, reports that Turkey should take an action against its increasing CO2 
emissions and that Turkey should consider the use of market-based 
instruments like pollution charges and emission trading systems to meet its 
objectives of efficiency and financing (OECD 2008). 
The ministry of environment and urbanization (MEU) delivered Turkey’s 
national vision within the scope of climate change in the National Climate 
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Change Action Plan: 2011 – 2023 (Ministry of Environment and Urbanization 
2011). Within this document, Turkey’s objectives are stated as becoming a 
country fully integrating climate change related objectives into its 
development policies, improving energy efficiency, increasing the use of 
renewable energy sources and decreasing its emissions. In managing CO2 
emissions, the Action Plan strongly emphasizes the establishment of national 
emission trading system in Turkey by 2015 and further integration with the 
existing and new global and regional carbon markets. In that regard, State 
Planning Organization (SPO) delivered Istanbul Finance Strategy and Action 
Plan, which defines the prospective national carbon market to be established 
in Turkey (DPT 2009). To make more emphasis on the dedication of Turkey, 
it is also crucial to note the initial grant of $350,000 to Turkey by World 
Bank’s Partnership for Market Readiness for developing and piloting of 
market-based instruments for greenhouse gas reduction (World Bank 2011).  
 Meanwhile, the environment chapter in the EU enlargement process 
has also opened. This chapter necessitates that the EU Emission Trading 
Directive (European Commission 2003) is to be transposed into Turkish 
Environmental Law as part of the legislation. Therefore, Turkey is eventually 
expected to integrate with the EU ETS market along its accession process to 
join the EU. As being world’s largest international carbon market, the EU 
ETS stands as a very good example for Turkey in establishing its national 
permit market and a potential partner for international carbon trading. 
In case of Turkey, while the lack of clear-cut emission targets results in a 
scarcity of quantitative studies, the lack of adequate economic analysis 
makes it even harder to formalize well defined emission targets and a 
probable design of such a cap-and-trade system. (Sahin 2004) is the first 
quantitative modeling paradigm to quantify the economic impacts of a 
regional cap-and-trade system and to compare and contrast the findings 
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with the applications of energy taxes. The model is set up as a static, single 
country general equilibrium model. The tradable emission permits, which 
are grandfathered, are added to the model following the primal approach 
defined in (McKibbin & Wilcoxen 1999). The model takes 1990 as the 
benchmark year. As a result of the policy simulations, it is seen that 
imposition of environmental measure in Turkey does not lead to a drastic 
deterioration of the economic performance and tradable permit system gives 
similar results with energy taxes in terms of economic efficiency. Sahin and 
Pratlong (2003) evaluate the proper regulation in a possible cap-and-trade 
system within the same general equilibrium set up in (Sahin 2004). In that 
regard, upstream, downstream and hybrid approaches, which are used in 
determining the liable entities under a tradable permit system, are tested. 
Main finding is that upstream approach is more efficient both economically 
and environmentally; while downstream approach offers greater flexibility. 
In a more recent study by Aydin and Acar (2010), the economic effects of the 
EU’s post-Kyoto mitigation policies under the case of Turkey’s accession to 
the EU are explored in a general equilibrium framework. In this study, the 
EU applies 20% emission cutback with regard to 1990 levels and Turkey is 
assumed to increase its CO2 emissions by 10% compared to 2010 levels. 
While the scenarios are run under the assumptions of capital and labor 
mobility, there exist two separate cap-and-trade systems in the model, i.e. 
one in Turkey and one in the EU. In that regard, the segmented cap-and-
trade system6 that the EU is planning to run in the post-Kyoto period is not 
fit accurately into the model formulation. Additionally, the integration 
between Turkey’s national permit markets with the EU ETS market, which 
                                               
6 ETS and non-ETS sectors are subject to separate systems.  
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will take place in case of the EU enlargement, is also not covered accurately 
in the scenarios.  
2.5. Longer Term Perspective on Market-based Regulations 
2.5.1. Linking regional cap-and-trade systems  
The literature on cap-and-trade systems has developed extensively since 
trading systems started to be used as one of the flexibility mechanisms with 
the Kyoto Protocol (Tietenberg et al. 1999). As the need for collective action 
against rising CO2 emissions grows, the part of this literature assessing the 
economic and environmental effects of linking different cap-and-trade 
systems also develops.  
Linking of emission trading schemes, in order to approach to a global 
carbon market, can be achieved via different ways. The first best policy is 
defined to be the top-down approach, i.e. imposing emission targets for all 
regions by an international agreement and allowing these regions to trade in 
a global carbon market. The second best policy is defined as establishing two 
way direct links between regional cap-and-trade systems (Browne 2004; 
Aldy & Stavins 2007a). The Kyoto Protocol and the conference of parties 
succeeding that have repeatedly failed to apply the top-down approach. 
Hence, bottom-up approaches started to be discussed extensively.  
Efficiency gains out of linking different emission trading schemes can be 
classified as static and dynamic efficiency gains. Flachsland et al. (2009) 
defines dynamic efficiency as increased international cooperation in the long 
run stimulated by increased bilateral cooperation. In addition to that, direct 
linking of cap-and-trade schemes results in price equalization across the 
linked schemes resulting in reduced aggregate abatement costs compared to 
ex ante abatement costs (Haites 2001; Blyth & Bosi 2003). The proper 
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functioning of the carbon market due to increased liquidity and decreased 
price volatility should also be counted as part of the static efficiency gains 
out of direct linking (Baron & Bygrave 2002). 
In opposed to its gains, linking may also lead to some efficiency losses 
due to strategic behaviors. Helm (2003) argues that allowance trading can 
give incentives for permit exporters in order to gain more from permit sales 
by simply decreasing their caps. On the other hand, Carbone et al. (2009) 
points out that, in case of an expectation for increase in allowance prices, 
there can also be an incentive for permit exporters to increase their caps to 
raise revenues from allowance sales.  
Besides its direct effects on the permit markets, linking provisions can 
also have some indirect effects on the overall performance of the economies, 
i.e. aggregate economic activity level, sectors, employment, factor prices and 
technologies. As a response to the changes in the volume of the permit 
market and also in the permit price level, the distribution among permit 
sellers and buyers arranges accordingly. The degree of ability to substitute 
between dirty inputs, i.e. fossil fuel inputs and also the energy intensity of 
production technologies determines the shifts in the regional abatement 
activities. Thus, the profiles of buyers and sellers in the market may change. 
Following that, the production levels and input compositions of sectors are 
also affected. Hence, as a result of linking provisions, the total economic 
activity also changes. In addition, shifts in abatement activities may induce 
other benefits in the form of reduced fossil fuel dependence and incentives 
for transforming economies into low-carbon economies (Westskog 2002). 
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2.5.2. Linking options for the EU ETS 
The European Union strongly encourages to establish direct links 
between the EU ETS and the other cap-and-trade systems for the post-Kyoto 
period (European Commission 2009). Articles 40 and 41 approve the 
cooperation with the third countries neighboring the EU, together with 
candidate and potential candidate countries. In essence, the EU considers the 
EU ETS to become the nucleus of an international carbon market (European 
Commission 2006; Aldy & Stavins 2007b). Two important features are noted 
by Ellerman and Joskow (2008), which make the EU ETS eligible for a global 
prototype: the weak federal structure with member states having certain 
degree of autonomy and the differences in economic and institutional 
development among the EU member states. 
Despite the overall cost effectiveness of bottom up linking between cap-
and-trade systems, it is not straightforward to conclude that linking is 
always economically and environmentally efficient for both parties. In their 
theoretical study, Eyckmans and Hagem (2011) show that the EU countries 
can benefit from the bottom up linking of regional cap-and-trade systems in 
case of certain trade agreements. They test their hypothesis in the numerical 
simulation between the EU and China for the year 2015. They find that 
under trade agreements involving permit sales requirements and certain 
levels of financial transfers, linking cuts the EU’s total compliance cost 
considerably. In another study, Anger (2008) states that there are strong 
signs to link the EU ETS with the newly emerging permit markets in non-EU 
countries by 2020. Thus, he studies bottom up linking of the EU-ETS with 
these newly emerging market schemes beyond Europe, i.e. Japan, Canada, 
the US and the OECD Pacific countries. Based on the numerical multi-
country, multi-sector partial equilibrium model of the world carbon market, 
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he finds that linking the EU-ETS with the emerging permit markets induces 
minor economic benefits for the EU. However, the economic impacts for 
non-EU countries can be various depending on the domestic inefficiencies. 
Thus, it is seen that the costs and benefits from linking highly depend on the 
characteristics of the linking regions. In order to accurately assess the 
economic impacts of linking, it is indispensible to conduct region specific 
theoretical and numerical analysis.   
2.6. Concluding Comments 
Cap-and-trade systems have been widely used since the Kyoto Protocol. 
The need for an international cooperation in worldwide mitigation efforts 
sped up the use of permit trading schemes. Though, a global carbon market 
seems still not applicable. Instead, as a second best policy, the linking 
between different cap-and-trade systems has started to be seen as an 
alternative to a global carbon market. As a result, the regional abatement 
strategies are not limited to regional permit trading anymore. Countries have 
also been following the policies for integrating into existing or newly formed 
permit markets worldwide.  
From that point of view, the EU ETS market, which is the largest permit 
trading market operating in the world, is defined to be the nucleus of a 
potential international carbon market. The European Union has already 
declared its commitment by integrating with national permit systems of 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein in 2008. In that regard, the EU 
enlargement process is also seen as an opportunity for increasing 
international cooperation in permit trading. Taking into account these, 
Turkey seems to be one of the most likely candidate countries to integrate 
with the EU ETS market as part of its EU accession process. However, 
Turkey is at the onset of establishing its national permit market and linking 
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with the EU ETS should follow as the next step. Hence, the essentials of both 
Turkish national permit systems and also of its integration with the EU ETS 
have to be analyzed and set carefully.  
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  CHAPTER 3
Analysis of Market-based Environmental Regulation in General 
Equilibrium Framework 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the MR-ETPA (multi-region environmental and 
trade policy analysis) model, which is a multi-region, multi-sector 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. I develop the MR-ETPA 
model mainly for simulating market-based environmental policies, the so-
called permit trading together with various trade policy interventions.  
Regarding the design of permit trading schemes, I give the main focus on 
the market segmentation and alternative ways of burden sharing worldwide 
via permit trading. Hence, the MR-ETPA model is capable of having permit 
trading markets both at national and international levels. National permit 
markets are able to integrate with the international permit markets. With 
respect to the market segmentation, the MR-ETPA model allows the sector 
coverage of CO2 abatement policies to differ across regions.  
Within the current set up of the MR-ETPA model, I also model other 
commonly used economic incentives for CO2 abatement, namely CO2 taxes. 
  
28 
 
The explicit treatment of trade linkages between regions further allows for 
modeling additional measures used in climate mitigation actions, such as 
CO2 border tariffs. 
The detailed elaboration of the underlying economic dynamics of the 
MR-ETPA model is given in Section 3.2. The methodology that I use in the 
characterization of the economic equilibrium and in the characterization of 
consumption and production behaviors are explained in Section 3.3. In 
Section 3.4, I further provide the details regarding the numeric 
implementation of the MR-ETPA model. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 have the set 
definitions, parameters, endogenous, exogenous and ancillary variables that 
I use in the algebraic and numerical formulation of the MR-ETPA model. I 
elaborate on the linkages between the theoretical underpinnings of the 
model structure and its characterization in Sections 3.7 and 3.8.     
3.2. Model Description 
The MR-ETPA model is a static CGE model of commodity and permit 
trading in multi-country and multi-sector setting. Market-based abatement 
policies incur additional costs to certain sectors in the economies, which 
often differ across regions. Hence, due to the changes in relative prices, both 
abating and also non-abating regions are subject to certain economic costs in 
terms of output and deterioration of international competitiveness. Hence, 
analyzing the economic impacts of market-based abatement policies in a 
partial equilibrium setting and neglecting the likely general equilibrium 
effects is definitely misleading in terms of quantifying the associated costs 
and specifying the underlying dynamics. In order to grasp the potential 
general equilibrium effects, I formulate the MR-ETPA model based on the 
Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium framework. The assumption of 
underlying optimizing behavior of all agents further enhances the relevance 
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of the MR-ETPA model for policy analysis, as the outcome of any policy 
intervention can be traced back to rational behavior. For the sake of the 
current policy agenda, I prefer to use general equilibrium framework in 
multi-country and multi-sector setting. This kind of treatment gives the MR-
ETPA model the ability to analyze the abatement policy options that the real 
world economies currently face in a more realistic way. Due to the increase 
in size and complexity of the MR-ETPA model, in terms of the number of 
production sectors, pre-existing taxes and externalities, I use computable 
general equilibrium format. The CGE formulation is useful in quantifying 
the magnitude, and thus not only the sign, of the impact of changes in 
exogenous conditions on key economic variables. Therefore, it becomes 
tractable with the MR-ETPA model to identify and quantify the general 
equilibrium effects of changes in exogenous conditions that initially are not 
obvious.  
In the algebraic formulation of the MR-ETPA model, all markets are 
perfectly competitive, that is to say, all agents are price takers. There is one 
representative agent in each economy who owns the primary factors of 
production, i.e. capital, labor and resources. Labor and capital are assumed 
to be mobile across sectors within regions but internationally immobile. 
Resource inputs are sector-specific inputs. All production factors are 
supplied inelastically in the factor markets. Each production sector takes 
primary inputs and produces only one commodity output according to 
certain production technologies. Products are either consumed in the 
domestic market or exported. The model also has separate government and 
investment accounts. Though, in the algebraic exposition of the model, these 
accounts do not have separate economic agents. Instead, representative 
agent in each economy is taken as the respective agent who is also 
responsible for government consumption and investment activities. 
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Demands for investment and public provision are exogenously fixed at 
benchmark levels. Tax revenues add up to the income of the representative 
agent. Each regional economy is open to trade with the other regions and 
trade balances are fixed exogenously. 
The underlying reason for using the macro closures combining fixed 
foreign savings, fixed real investment and fixed real public consumption is 
mainly to be able to explore the pure welfare effects in equilibrium of 
alternative policies in a static framework (Johansen 1960). Such a closure rule 
minimizes the biased welfare effects that would otherwise occur with 
endogenous foreign savings and real investment in the later periods, which 
is not possible to account for in a static model. In addition to that, since the 
model does not capture the direct effects of public provision on household’s 
welfare, it is also preferred to use government consumption as fixed 
exogenously.  
In order to include permit trading market, the static trade model is 
further expanded with integrating emission creation mechanism and giving 
incentives to trade permits. In the MR-ETPA model, permit trading is only 
allowed for CO2 permits; other greenhouse gases are not included in the 
permit trading. To establish CO2 permit trading market, permit demand side 
is specified as production and consumption units which are potential users 
of energy goods that cause CO2 emissions. The permit supply side is defined 
as governmental unit which is obliged to supply allowances to the CO2 
emitters. 
In each economy, CO2 emissions are created by use of fossil fuels, i.e. coal, 
oil and natural gas. The CO2 emitters which are required to hold allowances 
in equal amounts to their total emissions, can be either “upstream”, i.e. 
suppliers of dirty inputs, or “downstream”, i.e. users of dirty inputs. In 
  
31 
 
practice, it is more common to oblige downstream entities since this provides 
more direct response to any change in price levels, compared to upstream 
obligations (IEA 2010). In that regard, the EU ETS market also uses the 
downstream approach. As one of the main purposes of this study is to 
quantify the welfare effects of Turkey’s integration to the EU ETS market, in 
the model formulation, the liable entities that are charged for creating 
emissions are assumed to be the downstream entities. Hence, any production 
and consumption activity in the MR-ETPA model are taken as CO2 emitters 
which demand allowances equal to their total CO2 emissions.  
CO2 emitters are subject to certain CO2 quotas which are fixed 
exogenously. Allowances, in equal amounts to the target CO2 emission 
levels, are supplied by the governmental bodies. Auctioning is used for 
allocating allowances to the emitters. Three strategies exist for emitters. The 
first strategy is that emitters abate the amount equal to the difference 
between their allowance budgets and actual emission volumes. The other 
strategies are to abate more or abate less than the initial abatement schedule, 
which is fixed by the initial allocation. In the case of last two options, the 
emitters are also free to trade allowances at the permit trading market. The 
incentives to trade permits in the market come from the tradeoff between 
permit prices and marginal costs of abatement, i.e. emitters with high 
marginal abatement costs (MACs) have the incentives to buy permits from 
the emitters with low MACs. In the model formulation, the differences in 
marginal abatement cost structures mainly stems from the differences 
between regions, regarding the emission limitations, production 
technologies and consumption behaviors. 
Marginal abatement cost curves are widely used to illustrate the main 
rationale behind permit trading. They are also commonly applied in 
analyzing the permit market dynamics and permit price levels prevailing in 
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any cap-and-trade system (Ellerman & Decaux 1998; Criqui et al. 1999; 
Blanchard et al. 2002). In all these studies, it is implicitly assumed that MAC 
curve of each region is robust against any abatement policy taken abroad. 
However, the use of MAC curves should be taken with extreme caution as 
they are not necessarily independent of the intersectoral, macroeconomic 
and international interactions. These kind of inter-regional and intra-regional 
interdependencies are likely to affect MAC structures of different regions. 
Klepper and Peterson (2006) argue that MACs in a general equilibrium 
framework are affected by changes in world energy prices and the 
magnitude of the differences depends on trade patterns. In another study by 
Morris Jennifer et al. (2008), the MAC curves derived by using the MIT 
Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model are shown to be 
dependent on the level of abatement policy elsewhere. They test the 
robustness of MAC curves and conclude that MAC curves seem to be more 
stable if they are calculated by taking into account the shifts in the baselines 
for countries through changes in energy prices. In contrast to that, if the shift 
is not taken into account, they found extreme instabilities in the MAC 
curves, hence large errors in the predicted permit market outcomes.  
Due to the aforementioned caveats in using MAC curves explicitly in 
modeling permit trading, I take a different approach in the MR-ETPA model. 
In his theoretical paper, Montgomery (1972) proves that the equilibrium 
allocation of permits, the market-determined permit price and the aggregate 
costs of abatement are independent of the initial allocation of permits. Fowlie 
and Perloff (2008) further support this theoretical finding in their applied 
work. Therefore, depending on the structure of the MR-ETPA model with 
perfectly competitive markets and zero transaction costs, I implicitly derive 
the permit price as the respective shadow price of the aggregate CO2 quotas. 
The corresponding price is the price at which MACs are equalized across all 
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regions and sectors involved in permit trading. The equilibrium allocation of 
permits and aggregate abatement costs are derived accordingly. This way of 
modeling permit trading assures that each region’s MAC takes into account 
any change in abatement or economic policies abroad. This is mainly due to 
the fact that MACs are modeled as functions of both domestic and also 
international price levels. Thus, robustness and accuracy of the permit 
market outcomes increase.  
In the MR_ETPA model, permit trading is modeled both at international 
and regional levels. That is to say it is possible for regions to run their 
regional cap-and-trade systems and also to integrate with international cap-
and-trade systems, simultaneously. Furthermore, the model also allows for 
market segmentation, in the sense that certain sector groups are allowed to 
trade permits with each other. The decision regarding the grouping of 
sectors is on each region’s own initiative.  
3.3. Model Formulation 
3.3.1. Characterization of economic equilibrium 
In the competitive economy setup of the model, the preferences of 
consumers and also the technologies of activities are defined in terms of 
constant return to scale functions. Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
functions is especially preferred as they allow for different elasticity 
constants between different goods via nesting structure. Further details on 
the structure of CES functions are found in Section 3.8. 
Economic equilibrium is characterized as a mixed complementarity 
problem (MCP) (Mathiesen 1985; Cottle et al. 1992; Rutherford 1995). 
Therefore, equilibrium conditions are stated as weak inequalities: zero profit 
conditions, market clearance conditions and income balance constraints, 
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which feature complementary slackness with the corresponding equilibrium 
variables: price variables, activity levels and income levels. More detailed 
discussion of MCP approach to general equilibrium is given in Section 3.7. 
Zero profit conditions are algebraically stated as in (3.1), where “p” is the 
price vector, “y” is the quantity vector and “c(p)” stands for the vector of unit 
cost functions of the activities. As the complementary slackness condition 
implies, the activities are not slack as long as the unit cost of production is 
equal to the unit revenue.  
 
 ( ) 0,   0,   ( ) 0 p c p y y p c p     
 (3.1) 
Market clearance conditions are given in (3.2), in terms of the price 
vector, “p” and excess demand function, “z(p)”. This condition assures the 
supply and demand balance, as it implies that price level hits zero in case of 
excess supply. 
 
( ) 0,  0,  ( ) 0z p p p z p   
 (3.2) 
The necessary sets, parameters, price, quantity and income variables that 
characterize the economic equilibrium are given in Section 3.5. Additionally, 
ancillary variables used for the algebraic exposition of the equilibrium 
conditions are given in Section 3.5, as well.  
3.3.2. Activities and zero profit conditions 
3.3.2.i. Private consumption activity 
The representative agent (RAr) spends its income on private consumption 
after saving some amount of it. Consumption activity is made to maximize 
well-being, which is quantified in utility terms. RAr gets utility from 
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consumption of final goods, either domestically produced or imported. The 
corresponding optimization problem is given below, where Cry  represents 
the utility level and Crp  is the consumer price index in region r.  
 
max  
. .  
C
r
C C
r r r
y
s t p y income 
 (3.3) 
 The optimality condition of the utility maximization problem in (3.3), 
under the assumption of convex preferences, leads to the fact that the income 
balance constraint has to hold with equality at the maximum level of utility. 
Therefore, the condition (3.4) is included as the necessary condition for the 
utility maximization of the representative agent. 
 
C r
Cr
r
income
y
p
  (3.4) 
The consumption behavior of the RAr is formulated as a separate activity 
in the model formulation. Nested CES functions are used to model the 
private consumption demand. At the first level, non-energy material 
aggregate trades off with the energy aggregate. At the second level, both 
non-energy goods and energy goods are aggregated in separate CES nests. 
The corresponding zero profit condition for private consumption activity is 
given in (3.5). The left hand side of the inequality is the unit cost function, 
while the right hand side stands for consumer price index of region r. The 
user cost of energy goods is stated as the sum of their market prices and also 
the additional cost of holding allowances in equal amounts to the emissions 
they create during the consumption activities. The coefficient 2cojCrio  stands for 
the amount of emissions created out of unit consumption of fossil fuel j. 
Under mitigation policies, this also equals to the amount of allowances that 
the respective emitter must hold. The price of allowance is given by 2rpco  in 
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(3.5). It is crucial to note that the price that consumers face in each region 
differs from region to region.  
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 (3.5) 
3.3.2.ii. Production activities 
Production technologies of non-extractive industries are captured via 
there level nested separable CES functions. Figure 3.1 shows the nesting 
structure in more detail. At the top level, energy composite trades off with an 
aggregate of factors and non-energy inputs. At the second level, Leontief 
function is used to combine factor aggregate and energy aggregate. Energy 
composite is a CES aggregate of electricity and other fossil fuel inputs. At the 
third level, CES functions describe the substitution patterns between factor 
inputs within value-added composite and also between non-energy material 
inputs within non-energy aggregate. Producers pay ad-valorem factor taxes 
over factor inputs and also output taxes.  
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Figure 3.1: Production functions of non-extractive industries 
The zero profit condition for non-extractive production sectors is given in 
(3.6). User cost of primary factors is stated as  1fr firpf rtf  . While 
determining the energy inputs to the production, producers should take into 
account the additional cost of energy use, due to emissions they create. This 
fact is incorporated into the model formulation simply by using technology 
specific emission coefficients, given by 2cojirio . The downstream users of fossil 
fuels are subject to additional costs over each unit of CO2 they emit, as they 
have to hold permits in equal amounts to their emissions. In (3.6), the permit 
price is given by 2rpco . The permit price that producers face can be different 
depending on both the market segmentation and also the structure of permit 
market they are integrated with. The sectors involved in regional permit 
trading are subject to regional permit prices, while the sectors involved in 
international trading are subject to international permit price levels. In 
addition to that, the sectors belonging to different groups see different price 
levels, too.  
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Resource abundant extractive industries combine the sector specific 
natural resources and an aggregate of all other inputs at the top level using a 
CES function. This specification acts as a capacity constraint on the supply of 
the extractive industries. The other inputs are a Leontief composite of 
materials and the primary factor value added aggregate. Production 
structures of extractive industries are given in Figure 3.2. Producers pay ad-
valorem taxes over factor inputs. Production is also subject to production 
taxes.  
 
Figure 3.2: Production functions of extractive industries 
Zero profit conditions for extractive sector activities are given in (3.7). 
Just like the non-extractive industries, extractive industries are also subject to 
emission charges, given by 2rpco .  
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3.3.2.iii.  International trade activities 
Bilateral trade flows are modeled following the Armington approach of 
product heterogeneity (Armington 1969). All intermediate and final goods in 
the markets are represented as Armington composite goods, which are 
produced by the so called Armington aggregation activities.  
Armington aggregation activity of commodity i in region r is modeled as 
a two level nested CES functions. At the first level, domestic output and 
import composite of the same variety of the good trades off according to a 
constant elasticity. The constants of elasticity of substitutions are separately 
defined for each good, as seen in Figure 3.3. Use of both domestic output and 
imported goods are subject to sales taxes, which are irartfd and irartfi , 
respectively.  
 
Figure 3.3: Nesting in Armington aggregation activity 
(3.8) gives the corresponding zero profit condition for the Armington 
aggregation activity. The tax rate on domestic output, irartfd and on imports,
irartfı , are quantified from the sales tax rates on intermediate and final 
goods. 
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In addition to the imperfect substitution between domestic output and 
import aggregate, the imported goods, among themselves, are also assumed 
to be not perfectly substitutable. In order to capture that, a separate 
production activity is defined for the import aggregate, which is called 
import activity. As it is seen in Figure 3.4, import activity is formulated via 
two-level nested CES functions.  
 
Figure 3.4: Nesting structure of import activity 
Imports of the same variety of good from different regions trade off at the 
top nest according to a constant elasticity of substitution, which is variable 
across goods. At the lower nest, import goods from a specific region are 
aggregated with the transport margins in a Leontief manner. Two different 
tax schedules apply on international trade. The export subsidy on 
commodity i shipped from region s to region r, isrrtxs , applies on the value of 
export. In contrast, the import duty isrrtms is levied on the total value of 
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import, including both the import commodity and the associated transport 
margins. In the model formulation, export subsidy is directly paid to the 
exporting region by the importer, while import duties accrue to the 
importing region. This is clearly seen in the way of formulating the zero 
profit condition for import activity, which is given in (3.9).   
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 (3.9) 
 Aggregate domestic output is allocated between exports and domestic 
sales subject to imperfect transformability, expressed by a constant elasticity 
of transformation (CET) function. The underlying assumption while 
formulating the optimality conditions is that suppliers maximize sales 
revenue for any given output level. If the commodity is not exported, total 
output is consumed in the domestic market.  
 
Figure 3.5: CET transformation function 
The zero profit condition of export activity, schematically given in Figure 
3.5, is stated in the following equation. The left hand side of the equation 
stands for the unit cost function, which is basically the output price in 
competitive markets. The right hand side is the unit revenue function, which 
is a function of prices of exports and domestically sold output.  
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 (3.10) 
3.3.2.iv. Investment activity 
The volume of real investment is taken as fixed. Investment expenditure 
is an aggregation of final goods with a constant elasticity of substitution, 
which is equal to zero. The associated unit cost function for investment is 
given on the left hand side of (3.11), while price level for aggregate 
investment is given on the right hand side.  
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j
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 (3.11) 
3.3.2.v.  Public good provision activity 
Government expenditure consists of final good demand, which is 
assumed to be fixed in real terms. Total expenditure is modeled as a Leontief 
aggregation of Armington composite goods. As it is seen in (3.12), unit cost 
function is the summation of commodities with fixed shares.  
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 (3.12) 
3.3.2.vi. International transport activity 
The transport margins which accompany the international commodity 
trade are supplied by the international transport activities. Each region 
supply for this activity and the associated zero profit condition is given in 
(3.13). Unit cost function is defined as a Cobb-Douglas aggregate.  
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3.3.3. Commodities and market clearance conditions 
3.3.3.i. Domestic output in the domestic market 
In the domestic market, supply of domestic output has to match the 
domestic demand, which is the sum of private consumption demand, 
government consumption, investment and intermediate input demands 
from producers. The market clearing condition is given in (3.14). The left 
hand side is the total supply to the domestic market, which is a function of 
unit revenue and market price. The demand side, i.e. right hand side of the 
market clearance condition, is formulated algebraically in a more compact 
way. Total demand is taken as the demand from Armington aggregation 
activity. 
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3.3.3.ii. Domestic output in the world market 
In a similar manner with supply of domestic output in domestic market, 
supply of exports is also dependent on the presumed CET activity. The 
demand for exports is derived on the assumption that domestic demanders 
minimize total cost subject to imperfect substitutability between imports and 
domestic commodities. Total export demand also includes the demand from 
international transportation service, as seen in (3.15). 
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3.3.3.iii. Imports in the domestic market 
The domestic demand for imports are composed of intermediate input 
demands from production sectors and also private consumption demand, 
government consumption and investment demand. The aggregation of all 
these is given on the right hand side on the market clearance condition given 
in (3.16). This has to match the total import supply, irm , which is an 
aggregate of all imports of commodity i across all regions.  
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 (3.16) 
3.3.3.iv. International transport services 
Total supply of transport service of commodity j has to match the total 
margin demand for the same variety of good. Total demand is given as a 
function of Armington aggregates, aggregate import price level and also the 
price level of transport services. The associated market clearance condition is 
given in (3.17). 
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 (3.17) 
3.3.3.v. Factor inputs 
The factor market closure used in the MR-ETPA model is the default 
closure (Kilkenny & Robinson 1990). According to the default closure, the 
supply quantity of each factor input is assumed to be fixed at the 
predetermined level. Each production activity demands certain levels of 
factors according to factor prices and the scale of production. The factor 
prices are free to arrange accordingly until the sum of total demands from all 
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activities equals the quantity supplied. The market clearance conditions for 
mobile factor inputs and for sector specific resource inputs are given in (3.18) 
and (3.19), respectively. 
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 (3.19) 
3.3.3.vi. CO2 permits 
In the MR-ETPA model, there exist both international and regional CO2 
permit markets. Unless the economic analysis includes market-based 
abatement policies, these markets are not active. In the reverse case, the 
supply and demand in the permit market equalize according to the permit 
price clearing the permit market. The market clearance condition, in case of 
regional permit trading, is stated as in (3.20). The left hand side gives the 
total supply of allowances in the permit market in region r, while the right 
hand side is the total demand for permits. Extractive and non-extractive 
industries and private consumption activities are the potential demanders of 
CO2 permits. Therefore, total demand is given as the summation of permit 
demands from these sectors in (3.20). However, the model formulation 
allows for choosing which emitting sectors are included in the regional 
trading or not, just as how it happens to be in the existing permit trading 
markets around the globe. 
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2 ,  
YD XE C
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j j xe jr r r
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prets prets prets
  
      
  
 
 (3.20) 
In case of international permit trading, it is crucial to distinguish which 
regions and which economic entities in each region are allowed to trade 
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permits internationally. This directly affects the supply and demand profiles, 
hence the volume of the permit market and the prevailing permit price in the 
market. The market supply is derived as the summation of regional CO2 
quotas allocated to sectors, which can integrate with international permit 
trading market. Condition (3.21) gives total market supply on the left hand 
side of the equality. Regarding the total demand, it is given as the 
summation across all sectors and regions which are allowed to trade permit 
internationally.  
 , ( ),
2 ,  
YD XE C
jr jrets C r
r jr jr r
r j r j xe j r r
c c c
CO yd yd y pets
pets pets pets
  
      
  
   
 (3.21) 
The revenue from permit trading accrues to governments, hence 
representative agent in the MR-ETPA model.  
3.3.4. Macro Balances 
In the model formulation, the determinants of government income, i.e. tax 
rates and real government consumption are assumed to be fixed. This 
condition is complementary to the aggregate price level of government 
consumption as seen in (3.22). Therefore, the balance condition is that 
government savings is a flexible residual.  
 
,  G Gr r rG y p 
 (3.22) 
For the savings-investment balance, savings are assumed to be flexible 
while real investment is fixed. Investment spending adjusts to meet 
exogenous investment demand. Hence, the following market clearance 
condition holds: 
 
,  I Ir r rI y p 
 (3.23) 
  
47 
 
Since in the MR-ETPA model, there do not exist separate economic agents 
for government and investment accounts, the aforementioned balance 
conditions are stated in the income balance constraint of the representative 
agent. Under the assumption of fixed foreign savings, the income constraint, 
in case of a domestic permit trading market, is given in (3.24) and 
complementary with the income variable. The auctioning revenues are given 
as the product of regional permit price and regional allowances. The total tax 
revenue is expressed as the summation of production taxes, factor taxes and 
trade taxes. Foreign savings for each region, r is denoted in terms of the 
model numéraire, which is the consumer price index of the numéraire 
region, Crnump . In the model formulation, the region with the highest income 
level is taken as the numéraire region. 
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 (3.24) 
In case of international permit trading, the income balance constraint needs 
to be modified in the following manner: 
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3.4. Model Implementation 
For numerical solution of the model, the General Algebraic Modeling 
System (GAMS) is used (Brooke et al. 1998). The algebraic formulation is 
iteratively solved using the PATH solver in the GAMS environment (Dirkse 
& M.C. 1995; Ferris & Munson 2000). While implementing MCP format on 
the GAMS system, special meta language MPSGE (Mathematical 
Programming System for General Equilibrium) is used (Rutherford 1999). 
3.5. Tables of Model Variables, Parameters and Sets 
Table 3.1: Sets in the MR-ETPA model 
Sectors/commodities
Regions
Factors
Natural resources 
Exhaustible energy goods: coal, crude oil, gas
Fuels with high CO2 content: coal, gas, oil
Energy goods: coal, gas, oil, electricity
,i j
,r s
,f ff
( )res f
( )xe i
( )fe i
( )e i
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Table 3.2: Price variables in the MR-ETPA model 
 
 
Table 3.3: Quantity variables in the MR-ETPA model 
Activity level of domestic production
Activity level of domestic supply
Activity level of Armington composite 
Activity level of import composite
Activity level of private consumption
Activity level of public provision
Activity level of investment
Activity level of transport services
income r Income level of representative agent
iryd
iry
ira
irm
C
ry
G
ry
I
ry
jy t
 
 
Price level of domestic supply
Price level of domestic production
Price level of exports
Price level of import aggregate
Price level of Armington aggregate
Price level of transport service
Price level of primary factors
Price level of sector specific resources
pets CO2 price in international permit market
prets r CO2 price in regional permit market
Price level of private consumption
Price level of public provision
Price level of investment
irp
irpd
irpx
irpm
irpa
jpt
frpf
C
rp
G
rp
I
rp
irpr
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Table 3.4: Tax parameters in the MR-ETPA model 
Output tax (gross basis)
Factor tax (net basis)
Sales tax on domestic supply (net basis)
Sales tax on imports (net basis)
Exports subsidy (net basis)
Import tariff (net basis)
irrto
firrtf
irartfd
irartfi
irsrtxs
irsrtms  
 
Table 3.5: Cost share parameters in the MR-ETPA model 
Share of capital-labor-material aggregate in total output
Share of value added in capital-labor-material aggregate
Factor shares in sector i  of region r
Share of intermediate input j  in sector i  of region r
Commodity shares in private consumption in region r
Commodity shares in government consumption in region r
Commodity shares in investment in region r
Resource input share in exhaustible energy production
Share of domestic input in Armington composite good
Share of imports of good i  from region s  in total import value of region r
Share of exports of good i  from region s  in total import value of region r
Share of exports of margin j  in total import value
Revenue share of domestic supply
Revenue share of exports
Cost share of fossil fuels in total private consumption
Cost share of transport service j  from region s  in total transport service
klm
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Table 3.6: Exogenous parameters in the MR-ETPA model 
Factor supplies
Foreign savings
CO2 quota for region r in international permit market
CO2 quota in regional permit market
Coefficient for CO2 emissions 
from use of fossil fuel j  by sector i
Coefficient for CO2 emissions 
from use of fossil fuel j  by household consumption
Aggregate government demand in region r
Aggregate investment demand in region rrI
rG
2co
jCrio
2co
jirio
2etsrCO
frevom
rfs a v
2retsrCO
 
 
Table 3.7: Constants of elasticity of substitution in the MR-ETPA model 
Substitution between energy goods 
in private consumption
Substitution between energy and 
non-energy aggregates in private consumption
Substitution between non-energy goods 
in private consumption
Substitution between primary factors in 
non-extractive sectors
Substitution between non-energy goods 
in non-extractive sectors
Substitution between energy goods 
in non-extractive sectors
Substitution between factor- material aggregate 
and energy aggregate in non-extractive sectors
Substitution between natural resources 
and other inputs in extractive industries
Substitution between import aggregate 
and domestic input in Armington aggregate
Substitution between imports 
from different regions
t
Transformation between production 
for domestic market and for the world market
Ce
C
is
Cm
iva
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yd
is
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irs
a
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m
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3.6. Tables of Ancillary Variables  
Table 3.8: Ancillary variables 
 
 
3.7.  Theoretical Basics for MCP Approach 
3.7.1. General equilibrium  
Competitive economies are defined to be the economies where each good 
is traded in the market place at publicly known prices. Firms supply 
commodities into the market to maximize their profits and consumers 
demand these commodities in order to maximize their welfare. Firms and 
consumers are both price-takers. The wealth of each consumer is composed 
of both individual commodity endowments and profit shares of the firms.  
unit cost function of private expenditure
unit cost function of non extractive industries
unit cost function of extractive industries
unit cost function of Armington aggregation
unit cost function of import aggregate
unit cost function of investment spending
unit cost function of government spending
unit cost function of international transport activities
unit revenue function of output transformation activity
total output tax revenue
total factor tax revenue
total tax revenue from sales of domestic and imported goods
total tariff revenue
total export subsidy payments
permit price in region r 
(pets  in international market, prets  in regional market)
C
rc
YD
irc
XE
irc
A
irc
M
irc
I
rc
G
rc
T
jc
irr
YD
irtax
FT
irtax
A
irtax
M
irtax
X
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For a competitive economy of 0I   consumers, 0J   firms, 0L   
commodities, where each consumer, i I  is endowed with a preference 
relation on the consumption set iX  in 
 L , each firm, j J  has a production 
technology that is denoted by the production set jY  in 
 L  and each 
consumer’s ownership is given as a total of endowment vector,  Li   and 
profit shares  0,1
J
i  , the Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium is defined as 
an allocation * *  L  L( , )x y     and a price vector  Lp , which satisfy the 
following conditions (Mas-Colell et al. 1995):  
(i) For every j J , *jy  is the profit maximizing point in jY ; that is 
*,  j j j jp y p y y Y     . 
(ii)  For every i I , *ix  is the preference maximizing point in the 
budget set  
*:i i i i ij j
j
x X p x p p y 
 
      
 
 . 
(iii) For every l L , market clearing condition holds: 
* *
i i j
i i j
x y    . 
The existence of Walrasian equilibrium under continuous, strictly convex, 
locally nonsatiated and rational preferences on convex and lower bounded 
consumption sets and compact and convex production sets is shown for any 
price vector satisfying Walras’ Law (Arrow & Debreu 1954). Therefore, the 
necessary and sufficient condition for a given price vector to be an 
equilibrium price vector is stated as in (3.26), with the definition of excess 
demand function given in (3.27). 
 
    L  is an equilibrium price vector   0 and .   0p z p p z p   
 (3.26) 
 
( ) , ( )i i ij j i j
i j i j
z p x p p p y y p  
 
      
 
   
  (3.27) 
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According to (3.26), Walrasian equilibria can be expressed as the 
solutions of a system of equations. This is crucial for the sake of tractability 
of the numerical analysis of general equilibrium models. The proposition 
states that if 0lp  , then ( ) 0lz p  . Furthermore, it is possible that a 
commodity l is in excess supply, i.e. ( ) 0lz p  , when 0lp  . Thus, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium price vector turns out 
to be complementary conditions between price levels and excess demand 
functions as follows:  
 
( ) 0,  0,  ( ) 0z p p p z p   
  (3.28) 
Under the given assumptions for preferences and production 
technologies, the excess demand function is proven to be continuous and 
homogenous of degree zero. Thus, what matters for the existence of 
equilibrium are not the absolute values of prices, but the relative values of 
prices. Therefore, it is possible to normalize prices by choosing a numéraire 
commodity for which the price is fixed to some arbitrary number, usually to 
unity. Further discussions on the underlying assumptions and the existence 
proof can be found in (Debreu 1959) and(Arrow & Hahn 1971).  
3.7.2. Computable general equilibrium modeling  
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models simulate the general 
equilibrium economies based on the Arrow – Debreu framework. Simulation 
analysis starts with setting up a parameterized model. Empirical data is used 
in this parameterization to get a fully specified model. The model is further 
used to conduct comparative static analyses, in order to quantify the effects 
of changes of certain policy instrument variables. Generally, the models are 
solved using numerical methods, since closed form solutions for higher 
dimension models may not exist.  
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For the sake of analytical tractability and computational efficiency, CGE 
models generally apply some simplifications in the way the competitive 
economy is represented and also assume some specific mathematical format 
and assumptions regarding preferences and production technologies 
(Ginsburgh & Keyzer 1997). Typically, commodity set, L, is divided into two 
subsets: goods (indexed by ,i j J ) and factors (indexed by f F ). Together 
with the assumption that each firm has one good as an output, it is possible 
to use the same set both for produced goods and also for firms. Generally, all 
production factors and initial good endowments are assumed to belong to 
one representative agent (RA). So, the set I reduces to a single element set. 
Firms demand production factors from RA and intermediate inputs from 
other producers. Hence they supply final goods to the market. To guarantee 
the existence of competitive equilibrium, production technologies and utility 
functions are represented by constant returns to scale functions.  
Under this setup, the profit maximization problem of the firm with 
constant returns to scale technology is stated as in (3.29), where firm decides 
on its production level, jy , given the prices, p  and its unit cost function, 
( )jc p .  
 
max ( )
  s.t.    0  ,  
jy j j j j j
j
p y c p y
y j J
    
     (3.29) 
The associated optimality conditions for the profit maximization problem 
are given in (3.30) (Chiang 1984). 
 
 ( ) 0,   0,   ( ) 0 j j j j j jp c p y y p c p     
  (3.30) 
The utility maximization problem of the representative agent gives the 
optimal consumption level, u
y . The optimization problem is given in terms 
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of price levels and unit expenditure function, ( )ue p  as in (3.31). The 
following equation states the related Kuhn Tucker conditions. 
 u
max ( )
  s.t.    y 0        
uy u u u u
U p y e p y   
   (3.31) 
 
 ( ) 0,   0,   ( ) 0 u u u u u up e p y y p e p     
  (3.32) 
The Kuhn Tucker conditions from profit and utility maximization 
problems imply complementarity between activity levels and the so-called 
zero profit conditions. According to that, unless the unit revenue is greater 
than the unit cost/unit expenditure, the corresponding activity level is 
positive. If unit cost/unit expenditure exceeds the unit revenue, then not 
operating is the optimal action to take, otherwise operating leads to 
economic losses.  
Walras’ Law assures the complementarity between price levels and 
market clearance conditions. In competitive economy, setting these 
complementarity conditions are stated as in (3.33) with price vector p, 
activity vector y, consumption demand x and endowment vector ω.  
 
( ) 0,  with  ( ) ( , ) ( )p z p z p x p p y p      
  (3.33) 
Using Shephard’s Lemma, we can further express Walras’ Law in terms 
of price levels, unit expenditure and unit cost functions as in (3.34): 
 
( )( )
( ) 0,  with  ( ) ( )
j
j
j
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        
  

  (3.34) 
For the sake of completeness, in CGE modeling, income levels are also 
defined as separate positive variables which are complement with the so-
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called income balance conditions (Bohringer et al. 2003). The 
complementarity is captured in the following equation:  
 
0,  , ( ) 0l l l l l l l l
l l l l
M p p x M p p x            
  (3.35) 
Therefore, CGE models can be modeled as a square system of equations 
in which price levels are complement with market clearing conditions, 
activity levels are complement with zero profit conditions and income levels 
are complement with income balance conditions. This is known as Mixed 
Complementarity Problems (MCP) in the literature and defined as in (3.36) 
(Cottle et al. 1992; Rutherford 1995; Ferris & Pang 1997): 
 
 
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  (3.36) 
3.8. Constant Elasticity of Substitution Functions 
In applied general equilibrium studies, it is customary to use Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions in formulating production 
technologies and utility functions (Arrow et al. 1961). While guaranteeing the 
existence of general equilibrium, CES functions further ease the analytical 
formulation of AGE models. The generic form of CES functions are as 
follows:  
 
1
1
,  with 1 and 
1
i i i
i i
y x

   

 
       
 
  (3.37) 
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, where   is the efficiency parameter, [0,1]i   are the distribution 
parameters, and   is the substitution parameter which is inversely related to 
the elasticity of substitution parameter, σ. This general formulation of CES 
functions include Cobb-Douglas and Leontief function formulation with 
1  and 0  , respectively. As the above formulation allows only for equal 
substitutability between all inputs, it is common in the literature to use 
nested CES functions to handle different substitutability rates among inputs 
(Strotz 1957). Further discussion about nested CES functions and their 
analytical properties can be found in (Keller 1976).  
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  CHAPTER 4
Model Calibration and Benchmark Equilibrium 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter gives a brief overview of the structure of the model data and 
calibration. Section 4.2 starts with a general overview of the GTAP 7 data set, 
which I use in calibrating the model specific functional forms and exogenous 
parameters in the MR-ETPA model. Section 4.3 follows with detailed 
explanation of the specific mappings, which I use in aggregating the GTAP 7 
data set for the current set up of the MR-ETPA model. Section 4.4 gives a 
brief summary of the structure of the regional social accounting matrices and 
how global social accounting matrix is formulated for the multi-country 
setting of the MR-ETPA model. In Section 4.5, I give further information on 
the construction of the benchmark equilibrium together with the checks over 
macro and micro balances. Finally, country profiles at the benchmark 
equilibrium are given and discussed in Section 4.6.  
4.2. Overview 
The data used in the model calibration is based on the GTAP 7 data base, 
which represents the world economy at a global scale for the given reference 
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year, 2004 (Badri & Walmsley 2008). It contains input-output tables and 
bilateral trade flows, together with the associated transportation costs, export 
subsidies and import tariffs for 113 regions and 57 sectors.  
4.3. Data Aggregation 
For the specific requirements of the current policy analysis, I aggregate 
the GTAP 7 data base into a more compact dataset using model specific 
mapping routines. The model specific aggregation mapping is given in 
Appendix B. I run the mapping routines on the data base within the 
GTAP7inGAMS package (Rutherford 2011). Table 4.1 gives the final 
aggregation of sectors according to the mapping7. The energy goods 
specified in the MR-ETPA model are coal, crude oil8, natural gas, refined oil 
products and electricity. These are the main driving force behind CO2 
emissions generated through economic activities. In any abatement policy 
analysis, the CO2 intensity of sectors, therefore the economies, together with 
the technological ability of substitution between energy goods are crucial in 
determining the magnitude of welfare changes. Taking into account all these, 
energy goods are identified and treated separately throughout this work.  
Depending on their high intensity of energy use, under possible 
abatement actions, the energy intensive sectors are the ones to be affected the 
most. Though, these industries also have high capability in energy 
substitution, too. Therefore, it is also necessary to specify them separately in 
the model formulation. The energy intensive sectors are featured as: 
                                               
7 Each sector produces only one output. Hence, the set of sectors and commodities 
coincide. 
8 In the implementation of MR-ETPA model, crude oil is treated as material input since 
the volume of CO2 emissions due to crude oil are negligible compared to other energy 
goods. 
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chemical industry, non-metallic minerals, iron and steel industry, non-
ferrous metals, mining, paper-pulp-print and transport sectors. The 
remaining sectors are textile, crude oil and all other manufacturing 
industries, together with other economy sectors.  
Table 4.1: List of sectors  
OIL Refined Oil Products OMN Mining
GAS Natural Gas TEX Textile-wearing apparel-leather
COL Coal PPP Paper-pulp-print
CRU Crude Oil CRP Chemical industry
ELE Electricity NMM Non-metallic minerals
I_S Iron and steel industry
NFM Non-ferrous metals
OMF Other manufacturing industries
TRN Transport
AOG Other Economy
Energy Sectors Non Energy Sectors
 
Source: GTAP 7 Data base (Badri & Walmsley 2008) 
As the MR-ETPA model uses only labor, capital and resources as primary 
factors, the factor inputs in the data set are also subject to certain 
aggregations. Skilled and unskilled labor inputs are aggregated into labor 
input. Resources and land are mapped to the aggregate resource input. 
Regarding regional disaggregation, Turkey is treated separately, while 27 
European Union countries are all mapped into the EU aggregate. All other 
regions are aggregated within the region “Rest of the World”. Table 4.2 
summarizes regions and factors used in the MR-ETPA model.  
Table 4.2: List of factors and regions 
Factors Regions
LAB Labor TUR Turkey
CAP Capital EU European Union-27
RES Resources ROW Rest of the World
 
Source: GTAP 7 Data base (Badri & Walmsley 2008) 
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4.4. Regional and Global Social Accounting Matrices 
As it is customary in general equilibrium modeling, model data is 
presented in a balanced social accounting matrix (SAM) (Pyatt & Round 
1985). Following this tradition, the data used in this study is represented in 
the form of regional SAMs which are linked directly through commodity 
trade transactions.  
The transactions used in each regional SAM are given in Table 4.3. Each 
entry in SAM is basically a transaction between the selling and purchasing 
agents, which are identified by rows and columns of SAM, respectively. The 
values of transactions are given in billions of 2004 US dollars.  
Table 4.3: Structure of the social accounting matrix 
Commodities Activities Factors Households Government Capital
Rest of the World
(ROW)
Total
Commodities
Intermediate 
Input Payments
Private 
Consumption
Government 
Consumption
Investment 
Consumption
Exports of
Margins and
Commodities
Total 
Commodity 
Demand
Activities Domestic Supply
Total Domestic
Supply
Factors
Primary Factor
Payments
Total Factor
Income
Households Factor Incomes
Total Household
Income
Government
Sales Taxes,
Import Tariffs,
Export Subsidies
Output Taxes,
Value-added 
Taxes
Total 
Government 
Income
Capital
Household 
Savings
Government 
Savings
Foreign Savings Total Savings
Rest of the
World
 (ROW)
Imports of
Margins and
Commodities
Total Income
from Imports
Total
Total
Commodity
Supply
Total Expenditure 
on Inputs to the
Production
Total Factor
Expenditure
Total Household
Expenditure
Total 
Government 
Expenditure
Total 
Expenditure on
Investment
Total 
Expenditure on
Exports
 
The standard SAM distinguishes between accounts for activities and 
commodities (Francois & Reinert 1997). This is mainly to handle the 
production structures of activities producing different commodities. In the 
current framework, each activity produces only one commodity due to 
certain production technologies using intermediate inputs and primary 
factors. Production activities are also subject to output and value added 
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taxes. Domestic output is either sold in the domestic market or exported. The 
commodities account in SAM includes all commodities in the market, 
including domestically sold and imported commodities. Total commodity 
demand is comprised of private demand, public demand, investment 
demand and export expenditures. All commodity transactions are subject to 
sales taxes, while imported goods are also subject to import tariffs. Total 
factor income accrues to households and either spent on private 
consumption or saved. Government income comes from tax revenues and 
used for public provision. Total investment is financed by total savings in the 
economy, which includes savings from households, government and the rest 
of the world. In each regional SAM, the account for the rest of the world 
keeps track of the transactions between the region and the other regions, in 
the form of exports, imports and foreign savings.  
Table 4.8, Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 give the regional SAMs in an 
aggregate form for Turkey, the EU and the ROW, respectively. From these 
SAMs, it is not possible to read more detailed data like expenditures of 
individual sectors, taxation schedules, and composition of private 
consumption, investment and public provision. Nevertheless, they are still 
useful in the sense that they illustrate the circular process of demand leading 
to production leading to income, which in turn leads back to demand.  
Apart from constructing and balancing regional SAMs, it is also 
necessary to formulate a global SAM since the MR-ETPA model is a multi-
country model. In the context of the GTAP 7 data base, the global SAM is 
basically formulated as a series of regional SAMs that are linked via 
commodity and margin trade accounts. While doing so, it is assured that 
bilateral trade transactions are balanced. This balance holds for both 
commodity transactions, i.e. each and every commodity import by a region 
must have a counterpart commodity export transaction by other regions, and 
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also for margin transactions. Total demand for margins has to be equal to the 
total supply of margins. 
4.5. Constructing the Benchmark Equilibrium 
In this study, the regional economies are assumed to be in equilibrium, as 
given in the GTAP 7 data base, for the year 2004. This equilibrium is taken as 
the benchmark equilibrium, which is mainly used for model calibration9.  
In order for the necessary conditions of benchmark equilibrium to hold, 
the aggregated data base is further checked for optimality and market 
clearance conditions on the MR-ETPA model. Optimality conditions have to 
hold for each production and import activity, also for private consumption, 
public provision and investment activities. Market clearing conditions are 
needed to assure that all markets, including commodity and factor markets, 
clear.  
The data arrays10 and tax parameters in the GTAP 7 data base, which are 
necessary for the algebraic exposition of the benchmark equilibrium, are 
given in Appendix A. The sets used in algebraic exposition of benchmark 
equilibrium are given in Table 4.4. 
                                               
9 At the benchmark equilibrium, all price variables are assumed to be unity. 
10 Data arrays are given in billions 2004 US dollars. 
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Table 4.4: Sets (indices)  
Name Description
i  (alias j )      Set of tradable commodities and sectors
r  (alias s )     Set of regions
f   (alias ff )    Set of endowment commodities
g
Superset including the set of tradable commodities
and sectors - i , final consumption composite (“c ”), 
investment composite (“i ”) and public good
composite (“g ”)
 
4.5.1.  Optimality (zero profit) conditions 
For each production activity i in region r, total value of output, irvom , is 
equal to the total cost of production, which is the sum of intermediate input 
and factor costs, together with associated tax payments. (4.1) gives the 
corresponding optimality condition at benchmark equilibrium. Since all 
commodities are represented as Armington composite goods in the MR-
ETPA model, the total intermediate input cost is given as the summation 
over costs of Armington composites, jirvafm . The factor payments are 
defined in the second term of (4.1) as the summation over primary factor 
purchases. Each production sector pays output taxes over their production, 
YD
irtax  and also factor taxes over primary factors, 
FT
irtax .  
 
,  ,YD FTir jir fir ir ir
j f
vom vafm vfm tax tax i r     
 (4.1) 
The rate of output tax, irrto , on sector i in region r, is calculated as in (4.2). 
The second term on the right hand side of (4.2) gives the ratio of the sum of 
total factor purchases, firevfa , domestic purchases, jirvdfa , and import 
purchases, jirvifa , to the total value of output at market prices. Hence, the 
rest is calculated as the ratio of output tax. 
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( )
1
fir jir jir
f j
ir
ir
evfa vdfa vifa
rto
vom
 
 
 
 (4.2) 
The rate of factor tax on the use of factor f by sector i, firrtf , is calculated as 
the ratio of the difference between factor purchases at agents’ prices, firevfa  
and at market prices, firvfm , to the factor payments at market prices. The 
corresponding formulation is given in (4.3): 
 
1firfir
fir
evfa
rtf
vfm
 
 (4.3) 
In the MR_ETPA model, each commodity in the domestic market is 
represented as an Armington composite good. Hence, for each commodity i, 
a separate Armington activity is defined. The total value of the Armington 
aggregation iravafm  is defined as the summation over domestic and import 
purchases of the same variety of good together with the associated sales 
taxes. The total tax amount, Airtax  , which is given in (4.4), includes the taxes 
paid over domestic supply and imports. 
 
,  ,Air igr igr igr ir
g g g
avafm vafm vdfm vifm tax i r      
 (4.4) 
For the sake of algebraic exposition, igrvafm is reserved for denoting the 
purchases of composite good i, by sector g at agents’ prices. Hence, igrvafm  
already includes domestic and import purchases at market prices and also 
the associated tax payments. 
Sales taxes are collected over purchases of intermediate and final goods, 
which are given by igrrtfd  and igrrtfi  for domestically produced and imported 
goods, respectively. These tax rates are obtained from the data base by using  
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(4.5). As it is seen, sales tax rates are specific to the commodities, to the 
sectors and also to the regions. 
 
1  and  1igr igrigr igr
igr igr
vdfa vifa
rtfd rtfi
vdfm vifm
   
 (4.5) 
Since domestically produced goods and imported goods are not treated 
separately in the MR-ETPA model, it is not possible to use igrrtfd  and igrrtfi  
directly. Instead, additional tax parameters are defined to reduce the 
dimensionality. The tax rate on domestic composite good, irartfd  and on the 
import composite good, irartfi  are obtained from the original data arrays as 
follows:  
 
   . 1 . 1
1  and  a 1
igr igr igr igr
g g
ir ir
igr igr
g g
vdfm rtfd vifm rtfi
artfd rtfi
vdfm vifm
 
   
 
   (4.6) 
For each import activity i, in region r, the total value of aggregate 
imports, irvim , has to meet the total cost of exports of the same variety of 
good from any other region s to region r, isrvxmd , and also of the associated 
margin exports, jisrvtwr . Each import activity pays taxes in the form of import 
tariffs, Mirtax and export subsidies, 
X
is
s
tax . This balance condition is given as 
follows: 
 
( ) ,  ,M Xir isr jisr ir is
s j s
vim vxmd vtwr tax tax i r      
 (4.7) 
The differences between the valuations of commodity exports at market 
prices, 
irsvxmd  and at world prices, irsvxwd  are translated as rates of subsidies 
on commodity exports. The rate of export subsidy on non-margin export i, 
from region r to region s, is derived in as follows:  
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1 irsirs
irs
vxwd
rtxs
vxmd
 
 (4.8) 
Import tariff rate on any imported commodity i, exported from region r to 
region s, is calculated in (4.9). Import tariff is the rate of the difference 
between import value at market prices, irsvims  and at world prices, irsviws .  
 1irsisr
irs
vims
rtms
viws
   (4.9) 
In each region r, total value of private consumption, Crvom , government 
consumption, Grvom , and investment, 
I
rvom  equals the total spending on 
commodity purchases. Since all commodities are represented as an 
Armington composite, the corresponding balance constraints are simply 
given as summations over the value of payments, vafm . The conditions for 
private consumption, public provision and investment activities are given as 
follows, respectively: 
 
,  Cr jCr
j
vom vafm r 
 (4.10) 
 
,  Gr jGr
j
vom vafm r 
 (4.11) 
 
,  Ir jIr
j
vom vafm r 
 (4.12) 
The total value of international transport services of margin j, jvtw  has to 
be equal to the total payments of margin exports of j from region, r. This 
optimality condition is given as follows: 
 
,j jr
r
vtw vst j 
 (4.13) 
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4.5.2. Market clearing conditions 
Total domestic supply of commodity i in region r, irvom  is either exported 
to other regions in the form of commodities, isrvxmd , and margins, irvst  or 
demanded in the domestic markets. Domestic demand is composed of 
intermediate input demand from production sectors, private consumption 
demand, government demand and investment demand, which are 
quantified under parameter: igrvdfm . Market clearing condition for domestic 
supplies is given as follows: 
 
, ,ir ijr iCr iGr iIr irs ir
j s
vom vdfm vdfm vdfm vdfm vxmd vst i r       
 (4.14) 
Total imports of commodity i in region r, irvim  are demanded in the 
domestic markets as intermediate input by production sectors, as final goods 
by investment, government and household consumption activities. In the 
following equality, supply of imports is given on the left hand side and 
import demands are given on the right hand side. 
 
,  ,ir ijr iCr iGr iIr
j
vim vifm vifm vifm vifm i r    
 (4.15) 
Total supply of margins, which is given on the left hand side of the 
equality below, has to match the total demand for margins. Total demand is 
quantified as the summation of margin exports across all importing sectors 
and regions: 
 , ,
,  jr jisr
r i r s
vst vtwr j  
 (4.16) 
Total factor demand, given as the summation of factor purchases by all 
production sectors, has to be equal to total factor supply, which is 
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exogenously fixed at the level frevom . This condition is given in the following 
equality: 
 
,  ,fir fr
i
vfm evom f r 
 (4.17) 
As it is stated in (4.18) total exports of commodity i from region r, irvxm , 
equals the total value of imports of the same variety of good by other 
regions. 
 
,  ,ir irs
s
vxm vxmd i r 
 (4.18) 
4.5.3. Income balance constraints 
The household income constraint assures that all factor income is used 
for either private consumption, Crvom  or private savings, rpsav . Therefore, 
the income balance condition is stated as in (4.19). The left hand side stands 
for the total factor income and the right hand side shows the private 
expenditures: 
 
, Cfr r r
f
evom vom psav r  
 (4.19) 
The government balance sustains the equality between current 
government revenue and the sum of current government spending on public 
provision, Grvom  and savings, rgsav . Savings may be negative. The associated 
balance constraint is given in (4.20), where the total revenue from taxes is 
written on the left hand side and government spending are stated on the 
right hand side: 
 
,  YD FT M A X Gir ir ir ir ir r r
i i i i i
tax tax tax tax tax vom gsav r          
 (4.20) 
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In each region, total savings and total investment have to be equal. Total 
savings is mainly the sum of private savings, government savings and also 
the savings from the rest of the world. Using this equivalence relation, 
foreign savings of each region, 
rfsav , is implicitly calculated in (4.21). 
Foreign savings should exactly match the discrepancy between the total 
investment and the sum of private and government savings:  
             ,  
C G I
r r r r fr
f
YD FT M A X
ir ir ir ir ir
i i i i i
fsav vom vom vom evom
tax tax tax tax tax r
   
     

      (4.21) 
Foreign savings, calculated as in (4.22), should add up to zero. This 
condition, checking for leakage in the global economy, is given in the 
following equation:  
 
0r
r
fsav 
 (4.22) 
4.5.4.  Energy use and CO2 emissions 
In the MR-ETPA model, energy goods are specified as coal, oil, natural 
gas and electricity. Crude oil is treated as a material input to the production 
rather than an energy input. Depending on the production technologies and 
the type of energy good used, certain levels of CO2 emissions are generated. 
The amount of total emissions is linked to the use of energy volume by the 
use of sector and good specific emission coefficients: 2COjirio  and 
2CO
jCrio . In 
order to obtain the values of these coefficients at the benchmark equilibrium, 
“eco2” data array in the GTAP 7 energy volume data set is used together 
with “vdfm” and “vifm” data arrays in the GTAP 7 data set. These three data 
arrays together tell how much CO2 emissions are generated via the use of 
dirty inputs, i.e. coal, natural gas, oil and crude oil by certain production 
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sectors and household consumption. Hence, the sector and good specific 
emission coefficients are calculated according to the following equations:  
    
2 2 , ( ),
1 1
jirco
jir
jir jir jir jir
eco
io j e j i
vdfm rtfd vifm rtfi
  
      (4.23) 
    
2 2 , ( ), ' '
1 1
jCrco
jCr
jCr jCr jCr jCr
eco
io j e j c
vdfm rtfd vifm rtfi
  
      (4.24) 
4.6. Country Profiles at Benchmark Equilibrium 
4.6.1. Turkey 
Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is given as $296.255 billion for 
the year 2004. Looking at the SAM of Turkey in Table 4.8, gross output is 
read as $497.434 billion. More detailed breakdown of gross output across 
sectors is given in Table 4.5. Other economy sectors form the biggest share in 
total output. Transport and other manufacturing industries follow that with 
11% share. Textile, chemical, iron and steel and electricity sectors have the 
shares of 6.4%, 3.8% and 2.7% in total output, respectively.  
Total CO2 emissions are given as 202.24 Mt and the distribution across 
sectors are given in Figure 4.1. According to the benchmark dataset, 
emissions from electricity generation and household consumption form the 
bulk of the total CO2 emissions volume. Transport and other economy 
sectors follow that with 17% and 12%, respectively.  
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Table 4.5: Sector outputs of Turkey 
Sectors
Sector
Outputs (%)
Intermediate
Input Use
Production
Tax
Value 
Added Tax
Labor 
Use
Capitol 
Use
Resource
Use
oil 9.715 2.0 8.518 0.415 0.009 0.020 0.752
gas 0.038 0.0 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.017
omn 2.177 0.4 0.580 0.001 0.019 0.693 0.885
tex 31.935 6.4 20.653 1.030 0.121 2.729 7.401
ppp 7.076 1.4 4.217 0.213 0.031 0.583 2.033
crp 18.784 3.8 13.482 1.281 0.047 0.748 3.226
nmm 8.865 1.8 4.671 0.125 0.048 0.825 3.196
i_s 13.458 2.7 10.781 0.002 0.032 0.485 2.159
nfm 2.307 0.5 2.006 0.004 0.090 0.208
ele 13.621 2.7 6.014 0.343 0.086 2.624 4.554
omf 55.133 11.1 33.727 3.672 0.209 3.927 13.598
COL 0.760 0.2 0.264 0.020 0.006 0.141 0.329
CRU 0.552 0.1 0.106 0.005 0.106 0.334
TRN 52.216 10.5 22.055 1.254 0.340 5.619 22.948
AOG 280.796 56.4 100.106 3.283 0.730 98.803 77.874
Source: GTAP 7 Data base (Badri & Walmsley 2008) 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The distribution of CO2 emissions across sectors in Turkey 
Source: GTAP 7 Data base (Badri & Walmsley 2008) 
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The European Union is the biggest trading partner for Turkey. 52% of 
Turkey’s total import volume is with the EU, while 48% of it is with the rest 
of the world. The same pattern holds for the exports of Turkey. 58% of total 
exports go to the EU and 42% go to the rest of the world.  
Product decomposition of exports and imports of Turkey are given in 
Figure 4.2. Commodity imports of other manufacturing, chemical, iron and 
steel, crude oil, non-ferrous metal and textile industries constitute the largest 
shares in total import volume with the shares of 38.7%, 15.1%, 7%, 6.1%, 5.6% 
and 5.7%, respectively. Regarding the export profile, other manufacturing 
sector has the biggest share of 84.6% in total export volume. Textile, 
transport, iron and steel, chemical and non-metallic mineral industries 
follow that with 72%, 42%, 21.4%, 15.9% and 9.9%, respectively.  
 
Figure 4.2: Commodity trade volumes of Turkey.  
Source: GTAP 7 Data base (Badri & Walmsley 2008) 
Turkey’s bilateral trade patterns are given in Appendix C.1. Imports from 
the EU are mostly composed of outputs of other manufacturing, chemical, 
other economy, iron and steel and textile industries. Imports from the rest of 
the world show a different product composition. Crude oil, refined oil, 
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natural gas, non-ferrous metals takes larger import shares. Regarding the 
exports, patterns seem to be more similar with the EU and the ROW. Other 
manufacturing industries, transport, textile, iron and steel, chemicals and 
other economy sectors dominate Turkey’s export volumes.  
4.6.2. The European Union  
The European Union aggregate comprises twenty seven countries. The 
SAM in Table 4.9 reads the gross domestic product of the EU as $12938.3 
billion and gross output as $24168.885 billion. More detailed breakdown of 
gross output across sectors is given in Table 4.6. Other economy industries 
form 65% of the EU’s gross output, and other manufacturing industries, 
transport sectors, chemical industries follow that with 14.7%, 5.6%, 4.5% 
shares, respectively.  
Table 4.6: Sector outputs of the European Union 
Sectors
Sector
Outputs (%)
Intermediate
Input Use
Production
Tax
Value 
Added Tax
Labor 
Use
Capitol 
Use
Resource
Use
oil 330.910 1.4 287.097 33.529 1.127 3.232 5.925
gas 26.707 0.1 8.027 1.311 1.300 3.255 12.816
omn 62.302 0.3 33.483 6.367 2.974 7.660 11.818
tex 445.611 1.8 276.618 32.359 25.517 69.368 41.750
ppp 538.471 2.2 321.697 10.997 36.033 92.975 76.770
crp 1088.018 4.5 700.592 42.041 56.865 143.514 145.006
nmm 277.398 1.1 168.971 6.331 18.285 46.195 37.616
i_s 238.450 1.0 172.225 4.148 11.873 29.325 20.879
nfm 124.027 0.5 92.177 2.114 5.488 13.844 10.404
ele 359.630 1.5 168.329 18.945 20.005 48.621 103.731
omf 3546.895 14.7 2323.067 127.194 221.724 562.975 311.935
COL 16.070 0.1 8.926 -5.604 1.675 4.236 6.837
CRU 35.200 0.1 5.893 0.934 1.285 1.205 25.882
TRN 1360.193 5.6 897.123 12.242 68.157 189.455 193.217
AOG 15719.004 65.0 6935.864 211.777 1329.315 3546.687 3695.361
Source: GTAP 7 Data base (Badri & Walmsley 2008) 
The CO2 emission volume of the European Union is recorded as 3965.01 
Mt in 2004. The distribution of total emission volume is further given in 
Figure 4.3. Rate of emissions from secondary energy production is equal to 
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36% of the total emissions, while the rate of household consumption is 24%. 
Transport, other economy sectors, chemicals, non-metallic minerals and steel 
industry follow that 21%, 7%,3% and 2%, respectively. 
Regions within the European Union take the biggest share of trade 
volume of the European Union aggregate, while the rest of the world 
aggregate happens to be the second biggest trading partner. The share of 
imports within the EU is around 62%, while from the ROW it is around 37%. 
The same pattern holds for the exports, with 64% share of total exports 
within the EU and 35% share with the ROW. 
 
Figure 4.3: The distribution of CO2 emissions across sectors in the EU 
Source: GTAP 7 Data base (Badri & Walmsley 2008) 
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Figure 4.4: Commodity trade volumes of the European Union. 
 Source: GTAP 7 Data base (Badri & Walmsley 2008) 
Regions within the European Union take the biggest share of trade 
volume of the European Union aggregate, while the rest of the world 
aggregate happens to be the second biggest trading partner. The share of 
imports within the EU is around 62%, while from the ROW it is around 37%. 
The same pattern holds for the exports, with 64% share of total exports 
within the EU and 35% share with the ROW. 
As it is seen in Figure 4.4, commodities of other manufacturing 
industries, other economy sectors, chemicals, textiles, transport, crude oil 
and iron and steel industries take respectively the biggest shares in total 
import volume of the EU. Regarding the EU’s exports, other manufacturing 
industries have the biggest share of 39.4%. Other economy industries, 
chemical, transport, textile and paper-pulp-print sectors follow that with 
shares of 25.5%, 14.9%, 4.6%, 4.4% and 2.7%, respectively.  
Appendix C.2 gives the structure of bilateral trade flows between the EU 
and the other regions. The EU’s import flows from Turkey are mainly based 
on other manufacturing industries, textile, transport and other economy 
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industries. The EU is more dependent on the rest of the world in terms of 
imports of crude oil, chemicals, refined and natural gas. The EU’s bilateral 
export pattern does not show a significant difference for Turkey and the 
ROW, except for iron and steel industry. Export share of iron and steel to 
Turkey is bigger than the respective share to the ROW. The EU’s driving 
force exporting sectors are to be other manufacturing and other economy 
sectors together with textile, chemical, paper-pulp-print and refined oil 
industries.  
4.6.3. The rest of the world 
For the ROW aggregate, the gross domestic product is read as $27843.47 
billion and gross output, as $52823.02 billion in Table 4.7. 62.4% of gross 
output belongs to other economy sectors, 13.8% belongs to other 
manufacturing industries, while transport and chemical industries follow 
these with shares of 4.6% and 4.5%, respectively. Refined oil has a share of 
2.1% and crude oil has 1.6%.  
Table 4.7: Sector outputs of the rest of the world 
Sectors
Sector
Outputs (%)
Intermediate
Input Use
Production
Tax
Value 
Added Tax
Labor 
Use
Capitol 
Use
Resource
Use
oil 1116.626 2.1 1017.928 40.885 1.947 15.278 40.587
gas 314.469 0.6 111.552 14.431 6.588 38.430 143.467
omn 277.262 0.5 145.918 3.992 3.986 41.990 81.377
tex 1141.970 2.2 828.082 10.434 15.005 164.264 124.185
ppp 940.176 1.8 553.487 18.032 31.295 201.883 135.479
crp 2392.279 4.5 1665.254 41.353 44.501 303.513 337.659
nmm 539.521 1.0 338.847 10.977 11.046 89.411 89.240
i_s 878.917 1.7 659.193 18.957 11.214 87.569 101.984
nfm 543.257 1.0 400.928 11.265 6.972 54.537 69.555
ele 1026.984 1.9 570.703 20.020 20.162 109.914 306.185
omf 7294.034 13.8 5065.042 108.254 165.180 1164.982 790.576
COL 138.377 0.3 60.711 3.768 1.816 17.286 54.796
CRU 828.946 1.6 172.576 39.456 13.053 47.945 555.916
TRN 2454.108 4.6 1424.888 -4.212 74.067 551.592 407.774
AOG 32936.097 62.4 13253.701 845.940 1529.674 10571.067 6735.714
Source: GTAP 7 Data base (Badri & Walmsley 2008) 
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As it is given in Figure 4.5, total CO2 emission volume of the rest of the 
world aggregate is 21557.49 Mt in 2004. Compared to the other sectors, 
electricity production, transportation services, household consumption and 
other economy sectors are the ones that emit CO2 emissions the most. 
Refined oil, chemicals, non-metallic minerals and steel industries follow that 
3%, 4%, 4% and 3%, respectively. 
The biggest trading partner of the ROW is ROW again, with 76% of 
import share and 74% of export share in total. Export share of the ROW with 
the EU is 25% and import share with the EU is almost 24%. 
 
Figure 4.5: The distribution of CO2 emissions across sectors in the ROW 
Source: GTAP 7 Data base (Badri & Walmsley 2008) 
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Figure 4.6: Commodity trade volumes of the rest of the world.  
Source: GTAP 7 Data base (Badri & Walmsley 2008) 
As Figure 4.6 shows, exports of the ROW are more concentrated on other 
manufacturing industries, other economy sectors, chemicals, crude oil and 
textiles. The ROW seems to have commodity imports of more of other 
manufacturing sectors, other economy industries, chemical sectors, textiles 
and crude oil industries. 
Bilateral trade flows of the ROW with the EU and Turkey, which are 
given in Appendix C.3, do not show similar trends. Imports of the ROW 
from Turkey are more concentrated on textile, transport, iron and steel 
goods, while imports from the EU are more concentrated on chemicals, other 
manufacturing industries and other economy sectors. Export patterns show 
the same dissimilarity. The ROW seems to export more of crude oil, other 
manufacturing goods, other economy goods and chemicals to both Turkey 
and the EU. Though, export share of oil, gas and crude oil of the ROW to 
TURKEY is significantly higher than the shares of the same with the EU.  
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4.7. Social Accounting Matrices at Benchmark Equilibrium 
Table 4.8: SAM of Turkey for year 2004 
 
Table 4.9: SAM of the European Union for year 2004 
Commodities Activities Factors Households Government Capital ROW Total
Commodities 12400.090 7736.819 2726.025 2532.100 4185.273 29580.306
Activities 24168.885 24168.885
Factors 9462.492 9462.492
Households 9462.492 9462.492
Government 1169.504 2306.303 3475.808
Capital 1725.673 749.783 56.644 2532.100
ROW 4241.917 4241.917
Total 29580.306 24168.885 9462.492 9462.492 3475.808 2532.100 4241.917
 
Table 4.10: SAM of the Rest of the World for year 2004 
Commodities Activities Factors Households Government Capital ROW Total
Commodities 26268.81 17356.628 4294.9337 6119.69 6219.58 60259.64
Activities 52823.0238 52823.02
Factors 23434.16 23434.16
Households 23434.2 23434.16
Government 1289.2577 3120.056 4409.314
Capital 6077.5277 114.3801 -72.2139 6119.694
ROW 6147.3633 6147.363
Total 60259.6447 52823.02 23434.2 23434.156 4409.3139 6119.69 6147.36
 
  
Commodities Activities Factors Households Government Capital ROW Total
Commodities 227.189 211.774 40.729 59.322 83.694 622.708
Activities 497.434 497.434
Factors 256.917 256.917
Households 256.917 256.917
Government 26.010 13.328 39.338
Capital 45.144 -1.391 15.570 59.322
ROW 99.264 99.264
Total 622.708 497.434 256.917 256.917 39.338 59.322 99.264
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  CHAPTER 5
Economic Impacts of Market-based Environmental Regulation 
in Turkey  
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the major findings of a number of policy 
simulations for various CO2 abatement policies. The simulations are 
performed with the MR-ETPA model documented in Chapter 3 and 
calibrated to the data sources given in Chapter 4.  
Section 5.2 explains how the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario for the 
current policy analyses is defined and constructed. Section 5.3 starts with 
summarizing the BAU profiles of regional economies together with their 
carbon footprints and continues with the description of policy scenarios. The 
findings out of simulation runs for different counter-factual scenarios are 
stated in Sections 5.4 – 5.7. Concluding comments are given in Section 5.8.  
5.2. Business-As-Usual Scenario 
In abatement policy analyses, it is customary to define a hypothetical 
BAU scenario for any given target year, where the economies are assumed to 
not apply any emission reduction targets. The main reason is that abatement 
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targets are generally set for the long run based on certain assumptions 
regarding economic growth and potential energy efficiency improvements of 
the respective regions. Therefore, defining a BAU scenario eases to quantify 
and interpret the economic impacts of any abatement policy relative to the 
case where no abatement takes place.  
In this study, the target year is set as 2020 and the corresponding BAU 
scenario is calibrated on top of the base year economies in 2004. The 
European Union countries have already agreed on 2020 to be the target year 
for the post-Kyoto period (European Commission 2008), in line with that, 
there is also a consensus in the international arena for post-Kyoto actions to 
become effective for 2020 (UNFCCC 2011). Although Turkey does not have 
an official target year for binding emission limits, national permit market is 
to be established by 2015, which is further expected to be integrated with the 
EU ETS market as part of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU. From 
that perspective, constructing BAU scenario with respect to the target year 
2020 and taking that as the benchmark for abatement policy simulations in 
Sections 5.4 —5.7 seems reasonable for all regions included in this study.  
In formulating the BAU scenario, I use the forward calibration technique 
(Bohringer et al. 2009a; Böhringer & Rutherford 2010). The rationale behind 
the forward calibration of the model from the base year 2004 to the target 
year 2020, involves calibration to a steady state where all physical quantities 
grow at an exogenous rate, while keeping preference and production 
structures as close as possible to the initial ones at the base year calibration. 
In that regard, projections on regional GDP growth rates, energy demands, 
CO2 emissions and population growth rates are indispensable for the 
forward calibration technique.  
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For the projection data, I use two different sources. The projection data 
from the US Energy Information Agency – International Energy Outlook 
(IEO) - is used for the BAU calibration of the aggregate economies in the 
model, i.e. the EU and the ROW (EIA 2010). GTAP7inGAMS routines are 
used in aggregating the IEO country groupings in line with the region profile 
used in this study (Rutherford 2011). Since IEO data set loses its accuracy in 
more disaggregated forms of regional composition, it is further 
complemented with more detailed information from the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) for the BAU calibration of Turkish economy (IEA 
2011b).  
In the BAU calibration of each region in the MR-ETPA model, all factor 
inputs and other exogenous variables, i.e. real government and investment 
spending, are rescaled in proportion to regional GDP growth rate 
projections. Energy demand projections are further used to recalibrate unit 
cost and expenditure functions in order to match the actual projections of 
energy use and CO2 emissions. This approach implicitly derives the 
autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI) indices for each sector i 
in each region r. The AEEI index is a way of representation of non-price 
driven improvements in technology in order to mimic improvements in 
energy intensity of the economy which is not explained by fuel price changes 
(Jorgenson & Hogan 1991; Manne & Richels 1992). Incorporating 
technological change by the use of AEEI is one of the most commonly used 
approaches in computable general equilibrium analysis of environmental 
policies (Lee et al. 1994; Paltsev et al. 2005).  
For constructing the BAU economies, the MR-ETPA model is iteratively 
solved. At each iteration, technology parameters of production technologies 
and parameters of preference functions are recalibrated. The new 
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equilibrium price and quantity variables for the calibrated 2020 economies 
are obtained from this iterative procedure. 
5.3. Description of Policy Scenarios 
As this study mainly targets to quantify the potential welfare effects of 
Turkey’s application of permit trading mechanism both at regional and 
international level, the sets of simulations are determined accordingly. Since 
Turkey has not yet engaged in any kind of legal sanctions for CO2 emissions, 
the design issue of a national permit market brings lots of institutional 
dimensions that have to be tackled all at once. The very first and perhaps the 
most critical decision in designing an ETS is the total emission cutback ratio 
that Turkey should apply countrywide. It is possible to define caps as certain 
percentages of emissions for a specified time period, or as relative to various 
macro aggregates, i.e. production levels or GDP (Hood 2010). It is crucial to 
set emission caps tight enough to constrain emissions in order to create 
incentives for emissions to be reduced. Total cap amount further gains 
importance in an international permit trading market. The distribution of 
permit exporters and importers in an international ETS is directly related to 
the relative MACs, which is a direct consequence of the total caps imposed 
on regions. The following issue is about to draw the boundaries of the permit 
trading market, both in the real geographical sense and also in terms of the 
sectors, which are allowed to do permit trading. In geographical sense, 
different options are available, such as establishing domestic permit trading 
markets or establishing one way or two way linkages with the existing 
international permit trading or carbon offset markets. Needless to mention, 
the partners involved in trade has direct effects on the permit price levels 
and welfare consequences of any ETS application. Further issues in 
designing an ETS do exist, regarding the way of allocating permits across 
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sectors. Though, this study focuses on the first two issues from Turkey’s 
perspective and the simulations are designed accordingly.  
In all of the counterfactual simulations, the European Union countries are 
taken as to apply their 20-20-20 targets. Hence, the overall emission 
reduction target for the EU by 2020 is set as 20% relative to the 1990 levels 
(European Commission, 2008). This overall target by 2020 is expected to be 
achieved through emission reduction amounts of 21% for the EU ETS sectors 
and 10% for non-ETS sectors, compared to 2005 levels11. In this study, the 
sectors involved in the EU ETS are specified as electricity, refined oil, 
chemical, iron and steel, non-metallic minerals, non-ferrous metal, paper-
pulp-print industries. Table 5.1 summarizes the nominal reduction targets of 
the EU, as stated according to 2005 levels, and also the effective reduction 
targets, which are expressed relative to 2020 levels.  
Table 5.1: Emission Reduction Requirements for the European Union 
ETS Sectors 21 22.5
non ETS Sectors 10 8.7
Total 15 15.1
Nominal CO2 reduction
targets  (% vis-à-vis 2005)
Effective CO2 reduction
targets (% vis-à-vis 2020)
 
Source: Author’s computations. 
As it is seen in Table 5.1, the nominal reduction rates are not translated 
into significantly higher effective reduction rates. There is even a decrease in 
the cutback ratio of non ETS sectors. This is mainly due to low economic 
growth level, which is projected as 1.8% annual on average between 2004 
                                               
11 The installations currently covered by the EU ETS are as follows: power stations, 
combustion plants, oil refineries, iron and steel works, factories making cement, glass, lime, 
bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board. The EU ETS will be further expanded to the 
petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminum industries in 2013. 
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and 2020, and high improvement percentages in energy efficiency levels, as 
given in (EIA 2010). 
Among possible total cutback ratios that Turkey is likely to apply by 
2020, 10%, 15% and 20% reduction amounts in total CO2 emissions, 
compared to 2004 levels, are chosen and simulated. In all of the scenarios 
simulating partitioned permit trading markets, it is assumed that total 
reduction amounts in Turkey are distributed across ETS and non ETS sectors 
based on their historical emission amounts. Table 5.2 reports that, for the ETS 
sectors, 10% nominal reduction rate is translated as 24.2% effective reduction 
rate by 2020, 15% is translated as 28.4% and 20% corresponds to 32.6%. As 
opposed to the EU, Turkey’s total CO2 emission level increases significantly, 
resulting in higher effective reduction requirements with respect to BAU 
emission levels in 2020. If we take into account high economic growth and 
low energy efficiency improvement projections for Turkey, according to the 
IEA (2011b), the high differentials between nominal and effective reduction 
rates should not be surprising.  
Table 5.2: Emission Reduction Requirements for Turkey 
10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20%
ETS Sectors 10 15 20 24.2 28.4 32.6
non ETS Sectors 10 15 20 8.8 13.8 18.9
Total 10 15 20 16.9 21.5 26.1
Nominal CO2 reduction targets 
(% vis-à-vis 2004)
Effective CO2 reduction targets 
(% vis-à-vis 2020)
 
Source: Author’s computations. 
Regarding the market boundaries of permit trading, Turkey can choose 
among different options. Establishing a domestic permit trading market, 
which covers all CO2 emitting sectors, or having sector-based partitions 
within this domestic market are among the alternatives which Turkey can 
apply of its own free will. Integrating with the EU ETS market is another and 
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most likely option when Turkey backs international cooperation in 
environmental policy applications. Therefore, in order to address these 
possible options in front of Turkey, the following scenarios are simulated.  
 NOACT: Turkey does not take any abatement action.  
 NP_rETS: Turkey sets binding CO2 emission quota and establishes a 
comprehensive domestic permit trading market, which encompasses 
all CO2 emitting sectors.  
 P_rETS: Turkey separates its national permit trading market into two 
main parts, i.e. ETS sectors and non ETS sectors12. The respective 
emission reduction targets for the sectors are set in proportion to their 
2004 emission levels. While ETS sectors are allowed to trade permits 
with each other, non ETS sectors are subject to separate abatement 
policies.  
 EU_ETS: Turkey separates its national permit trading market into two 
segments, i.e. ETS sectors trading permits within the EU ETS and non 
ETS sectors being subject to other domestic abatement policies. The 
emission reduction targets for ETS and non ETS sectors are set in 
proportion to their 2004 emission levels.  
5.4. NOACT: No Abatement Case  
As the EU applies CO2 quotas on both ETS and non ETS sectors, the 
permit price in the ETS market realizes as $17.73 per ton of CO2, while MACs 
of non ETS sectors are equal to $84.19 per ton of CO2. This direct cost burden 
on CO2 emitting sectors affects the production costs and the supply patterns 
in the EU. As Table 5.21 shows, the production levels of all sectors in the EU, 
                                               
12 The distinction between ETS and non ETS sectors are made in line with the one in the 
EU ETS market. 
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except for other economy (AOG) sectors, show significant declines. Energy 
sectors, mainly coal, refined and crude oil, natural gas and electricity sectors 
are the ones to show the highest decrease. Other energy intensive sectors 
also decrease their scale of productions due to both high energy prices and 
also direct CO2 quota. The change in the aggregate economic activity in the 
European Union is given in Table 5.4 as a decrease of 0.24% compared to the 
BAU scenario.  
Table 5.3: Marginal abatement costs in the EU  
($ per ton of CO2) 
NOACT
10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20%
ETS
Sectors
17.73 17.76 17.77 17.78 17.76 17.77 17.78 17.9 18.24 18.59
non ETS
Sectors
84.19 84.24 84.29 84.37 84.24 84.26 84.3 84.23 84.27 84.33
P_rETS NP_rETS EU_ETS
Source: Author’s computations. 
Following the contraction in the EU economy, total labor and capital 
demand also decrease and factor prices arrange accordingly. Compared to 
their BAU levels, the rental rate of capital decreases by 0.63%, wage rate 
decreases by 0.68% and the rental rate of resource inputs also decrease with 
the biggest decline seen in the coal sector, 23.7%. In addition to decrease in 
factor demands, there is also considerable decline in intermediate input 
demands, especially in the primary energy carriers, in a way favoring the use 
of imported secondary energy carriers. The increase in the use of imported 
electricity is quantified around 1.89%, compared to its BAU level. The 
demands for domestically produced primary energy goods decline by 
30.16% for coal, by 7.22% for natural gas and by 4.46% for oil. The demand 
for imported fossil fuels follows the same pattern qualitatively, i.e. decline of 
43.18% in coal imports, 9.41% in natural gas imports and 4.55% in oil 
imports. 
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Table 5.4: Real GDP under NOACT scenario  
(billion 2004 USD) 
2004 2020 NOACT
Turkey 296.255 513.982 514.320
EU 12938.300 16868.932 16828.295  
Source: Author’s computations. 
While factor prices decline in the EU, the disposable income level of the 
representative agent in the EU increases by 0.53%, in comparison to BAU 
level of income. This increase mainly stems from the lump sum transfer of 
permit auctioning revenues to the representative agent. At the first glance, it 
seems as if the increase in level of income should translate as increase in 
welfare. However, due to the loss in their competitiveness of European 
industries, depending both on increasing marginal costs of production and 
also on positive spillover effects on other trading partners of the EU, we 
observe a high increase in consumer price index (CPI) level, which is around 
0.93%, compared to BAU price level. Hence, the welfare change of the EU, 
given in terms of Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) in income in Figure 
5.1, realizes as welfare loss of 0.38% compared to BAU scenario. 
 
Figure 5.1: Welfare costs of abatement strategies for the EU  
(in HEV of BAU income) 
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In opposed to the economic welfare losses, the European Union benefits 
from decreasing CO2 emission levels, and furthermore, from decreasing CO2 
intensity of its production technologies. As it is seen in Table 5.24, while the 
CO2 intensity of the European economy is recorded as 0.236 Mt CO2 per 2004 
USD under BAU scenario, it decreases to 0.200 Mt CO2 per 2004 USD under 
NOACT scenario. This is mainly due to the increasing cost pressure on the 
use of fossil fuels, which further gives incentives for switching to less 
carbon- intense production processes.  
Abatement policies in the EU affect not only the domestic markets but 
also the world markets. The EU is one of the three biggest users and 
importers of energy goods in the world economy. Therefore, any change in 
the EU’s both domestic and import demand for energy goods, as a result of 
abatement policies, results in new price and quantity adjustments not only in 
domestic markets but also in world markets. These chain effects are known 
as “terms of trade effects” in the literature. In CO2 abatement policies, terms of 
trade effects occur mainly due to the differences in production technologies 
of the economies and the relative position of countries in terms of abatement 
cutbacks. Non abating countries gain comparative advantage in the 
production of energy intensive commodities due to their relatively low 
MACs compared to the abating countries having high MACs. Additionally, 
CO2 restrictions directly affect the demand for fossil fuels in the world 
markets. Change in prices due to shifts in aggregate demand for fossil fuels 
creates substantial spillover effects to other regions. The literature on terms 
of trade effects concludes that the effects of changes in fossil fuel prices 
mostly dominate the effects of changes in comparative advantages 
(Bohringer & Rutherford 2002; Babiker et al. 2004). For countries that are not 
subject to any additional abatement targets, it is shown that changes in the 
world energy markets affect fossil fuel exporters negatively, while fuel 
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importers are positively affected by these spillover effects (Bernstein et al. 
1999; Babiker et al. 2000). 
Table 5.5: Commodity trade volumes under NOACT scenario  
(billion 2004 USD) 
Partner 2020 NOACT
Import 151.556 151.471
EU 80.175 79.776
ROW 71.381 71.695
Export 170.417 170.006
EU 93.213 93.401
ROW 77.204 76.606
Import 5424.642 5413.773
TUR 93.213 93.401
EU 3272.763 3262.299
ROW 2058.666 2058.074
Export 5492.980 5459.323
TUR 80.175 79.776
EU 3272.763 3262.299
ROW 2140.042 2117.249
T
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Source: Author’s computations. 
As it is seen in Table 5.5, the EU’s total commodity imports decrease as a 
result of its abatement policies. It is crucial to note that the biggest portion of 
this decrease, in comparison to BAU case, stems from the severe decline in 
imports of primary energy goods i.e. refined oil, natural gas, coal and crude 
oil. These cutbacks in international fossil fuel demand immediately translate 
into depressed international fuel prices. As all other fuel importers, Turkey, 
benefits from decreasing fuel price levels, and increases its fuel imports. 
Turkey’s coal imports increases by 2.01%, crude oil imports rises by 0.62%, 
while imports of natural gas and oil increases by 0.62% and 0.36%, 
respectively, compared to their BAU levels. This is the main reason behind 
the increasing imports of Turkey from the rest of the world, which rises to 
$71.695 billion. Due to cheaper primary energy imports, the secondary 
energy sectors increase their scale of production and electricity prices 
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decrease in the domestic market. Table 5.20 reports this positive scale effects 
as 0.55% on refined oil industry and as 0.10% in electricity sector.  
Supposedly, cheaper energy prices should also cause positive scale 
effects on other non-energy sectors, too. However, non-energy sectors are 
exposed to other scale effects due to product heterogeneity of traded goods. 
Depending on the interdependence between regions via international trade, 
higher prices of exports from abating regions, together with decreasing 
import demand in abating regions may lead to negative scale effects on some 
production sectors in non-abating trade partners. The relative differences in 
production technologies, together with changing input compositions, affect 
the competitiveness of each producer both in domestic and also in the world 
markets. Changing trade patterns may or may not offset these positive scale 
effects due to world energy prices. Therefore, the net scale effect on non-
energy sectors remains to be ambiguous.  
In Turkey’s case, transport services, and chemical industries increase 
their scale of production by 1.07% and 0.09%, respectively. High dependency 
on fossil fuels is the main driving force of the growth in real outputs of these 
sectors. Non-ferrous metals industry also increases its scale of production by 
0.56%, which is mainly due to cheap imports of non-ferrous metals input 
from the rest of the world aggregate. In opposed to that, as Table 5.22 shows, 
export oriented industries, most of which are the manufacturing industries, 
including iron and steel industry, non-metallic minerals and textile industry, 
are all exposed to negative scale effects. The effect of decreasing import 
demand from the EU and shifting trade patterns gradually undermines the 
positive scale effect, stemming from depressed international fuel prices, on 
export oriented industries. It is given in Table 5.5 that while Turkey’s exports 
to the rest of the world decreases, exports to the EU increases. However, 
when we check the bilateral commodity trade volumes, we immediately see 
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that Turkey’s exports to the EU change in such a way favoring more of 
exports of transport services and electricity. Turkey’s exports to the rest of 
the world decreases in all sectors, except for non-ferrous metals, electricity, 
and transport sectors. 
Table 5.6: CO2 emission profile under NOACT scenario  
(Mt of CO2) 
CO2
Emissions
2020 NOACT
Total 219.074 220.200
ETS Sectors 115.887 116.398
non ETS Sectors 103.187 103.802
Total 3969.096 3368.937
ETS Sectors 1848.408 1433.304
non ETS Sectors 2120.688 1935.633
T
u
rk
ey
E
U
   
Source: Author’s computations. 
When we look at the evolution of overall economic activity in Turkey 
under NOACT scenario, we see that GDP rises from $513.982 billion to 
$514.320 billion. Following that, total demand for labor and capital also 
increase in Turkey, leading to 0.29% increase in rental rate of capital and 
0.22% increase in wage rate. Since importing fossil fuels becomes more 
favorable for Turkey, the scale of production in extractive industries 
decrease which is followed by a decrease in rental rate of resources. In 
comparison to the BAU level, the change in the level of income of 
representative agent is read as an increase of 1.26%. Depending on cheaper 
input prices and increased scale of domestic output in domestic markets, the 
rate of increase in CPI happens to be 0.15%, which is relatively far less than 
the change in income level. Therefore, as it is seen in Figure 5.2, Turkey has 
welfare gains under NOACT scenario. 
Increased scale of economic activity in Turkey causes certain level of CO2 
leakage. In contrast to emission reduction of 600.159 Mt of CO2 in the EU 
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countries, Turkey increases its total CO2 emissions from 219.074 Mt of CO2 to 
220.200 Mt of CO2. According to the emission profiles, given in Table 5.6, 
ETS sectors are the main driving force behind the increase in Turkey’s CO2 
emissions. While CO2 emissions from ETS sectors happen to be 115.887 Mt of 
CO2 under BAU scenario, it increases to 116.398 Mt of CO2. The positive scale 
effects on overall economic activity and also the shift in the use of energy 
inputs in production sectors give rise to this CO2 leakage. Under NOACT 
scenario, positive spillover effects from decreased international fuel demand, 
cause primary energy goods, especially, coal, natural gas and oil, to be used 
more intensely in Turkish production sectors. Hence, each unit production 
results in more emissions compared to the BAU economy. This change in the 
production patterns is clearly seen in the CO2 intensity data given in Table 
5.24. The CO2 intensity of the Turkish economy increases to 0.428 Mt of CO2 
per 2004 USD under NOACT scenario from 0.426 Mt CO2 per 2004 USD, 
which is the intensity level of the BAU economy. 
Table 5.7: Marginal Abatement Costs in Turkey  
($ per ton of CO2) 
NOACT
10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20%
ETS
Sectors
-- 20.09 26.63 34.91 19.9 29.74 43.25 17.9 18.24 18.59
non ETS
Sectors
-- 19.42 38.39 67.55 19.9 29.74 43.25 19.38 38.27 67.46
P_rETS NP_rETS EU_ETS
Source: Author’s computations.  
5.5. NP_rETS: Non Partitioned Regional ETS Market  
Under comprehensive trading scheme, there realizes only a unique 
permit price in Turkey. Under 10% cutback ratio, the permit price is equal to 
$19.9 per ton of CO2. The permit price level, which is the respective shadow 
price of the corresponding CO2 quota, is expected to raise depending on the 
severity of the emission constraints. What we see in Table 5.7 is that permit 
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price level increases in a nonlinear fashion as cutback requirement increases 
under NP_rETS scenario. The price level clearing the permit market is $29.74 
and $43.25, under 15% and 20% quota, respectively.  
Table 5.8: CO2 emission profile under NP_rETS scenario  
(Mt of CO2) 
C
O
2
E
m
is
si
on
s
2020 NOACT
NP_rETS
10%
NP_rETS
15%
NP_rETS
20%
Total 219.074 220.200 182.014 171.902 161.790
ETS Sectors 115.887 116.398 88.053 80.894 73.945
non-ETS Sectors 103.187 103.802 93.961 91.008 87.845
Total 3969.096 3368.937 3368.937 3368.937 3368.937
ETS Sectors 1848.408 1433.304 1433.304 1433.304 1433.304
non-ETS Sectors 2120.688 1935.633 1935.633 1935.633 1935.633
T
u
rk
ey
E
U
Source: Author’s computations. 
Table 5.8 summarizes the total emission quotas that Turkey is 
constrained with. The distribution of total CO2 allowances across sectors 
occurs in the market place according to the differences between incentives of 
permit buyers and sellers. Emitters with high MACs are inclined to buy 
permits while emitters with low MACs want to sell their permits in the 
market place. These incentives move in the direction where all MACs are 
equalized across all emitters. The final permit distribution at that point is the 
efficient allocation of permits across sectors due to the comprehensive nature 
of trading. At the efficient allocation given in Table 5.8, the rate of emission 
cutback in ETS sectors is higher than the rate in non ETS sectors. That is to 
say most of the abatement cost burden is carried by ETS sectors. The 
emissions from ETS sectors decrease from 115.887 Mt of CO2 to 88.053 Mt of 
CO2 under 10% cutback. This further reaches to 73.945 Mt of CO2 under 20% 
cutback. The emissions from non ETS sectors decrease from 103.187 Mt of 
CO2 to 93.961 Mt of CO2 under 10% cutback, to 91.008 Mt of CO2 under 15% 
quota and to 87.845 Mt of CO2 under 20% quota. 
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This extra cost burden on the Turkish economy affects the production 
sectors in a negative way. All sectors, except for the transport sector, 
decrease their scale of productions compared to the BAU case. It is especially 
the energy sectors, i.e. coal, electricity, natural gas and oil, and also the 
energy intensive sectors, such as iron and steel, chemicals and non-metallic 
minerals, that have severe declines in their real output levels. As Table 5.20 
summarizes, the contraction in these sectors continues to grow as the 
amount of cutback ratio increases. In contrast to others, transport sector 
continues to expand its scale in a decreasing rate with increasing quota level. 
The effects of comprehensive regional permit trading on the GDP level is 
given in Table 5.9. The GDP level of Turkey under a comprehensive trading 
regime is less than the GDP level realizing under NOACT scenario. 
Additionally, compared to BAU scenario, the GDP level of Turkey also 
decreases by 0.23% under 10% CO2 quota. The rate of decrease in level of 
GDP increases to 0.38% under 15% quota and 0.59% under 20% quota.  
Table 5.9: Real GDP under NP_rETS scenario  
(billion 2004 USD)  
2004 2020
NP_rETS 
10%
NP_rETS 
15%
NP_rETS 
20%
Turkey 296.255 513.982 512.800 512.010 510.938
EU 12938.300 16868.932 16828.409 16828.459 16828.523
Source: Author’s computations. 
 The negative scale effects on sectors in Turkish economy, except for the 
transport sector, cause total factor demands to decrease. The change in rental 
rate of capital compared to the BAU level realizes as -0.65% under 10% 
cutback, -1.08% and -1.62% under 15% and 20% quota, respectively. In a 
similar fashion, the wage rate decreases by 0.67%, under 10% quota and the 
amount of decrease increases up to 1.55% under 20% quota. In contrast to the 
decrease in total factor income, the disposable level of income of the 
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representative agent increases by 0.06% under 10% CO2 quota. This increase 
is mainly due to the increase in the auctioning revenues. In opposed to this, 
the level of income decreases by 0.06% and by 0.22% under 15% and 20% 
quota, respectively. Additional income from auctioning cannot compensate 
for the loss in factor and other tax incomes. The CPI is also expected to rise 
due to the extra cost burden of abatement. The increase in CPI under 10% 
quota is quantified as 0.35%, while it is 0.46% and 0.60% under 15% and 20% 
quota, respectively. Therefore, as Figure 5.2 shows graphically, Turkey 
suffers from a certain degree of welfare loss under comprehensive regional 
permit trading regime. This loss is around 0.30% under 10% quota and it 
further increases to 0.80% under 20% quota. For low levels of cutback ratios, 
the increase in the income level can compensate for the increase in CPI. 
Hence, the welfare loss is small compared to the welfare loss in higher levels 
of cutback ratios.  
 
Figure 5.2: Welfare costs of abatement strategies for Turkey  
(in HEV of BAU income) 
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Besides noting Turkey’s losses in economic welfare, it is also crucial to 
emphasize the improvement in Turkey’s environmental indicators. As Table 
5.24 shows, the CO2 intensity of the Turkish economy decreases to 0.355 Mt 
CO2 per 2004 USD under NP_rETS scenario. As the cutback requirement 
increases, the intensity further decreases to 0.336 and 0.317 under 15% and 
20% caps, respectively. Hence, while Turkey suffers from welfare losses in 
terms of total consumption, it also benefits from increased environmental 
quality and incentives for transforming into less carbon-intense economy.   
Total commodity exports of Turkey decreases from $170.417 billion to 
$169.157 billion with 10% total abatement ratio. As it is reported in Table 
5.10, as the cutback ratio increases, total export volume continues to decrease 
due to the decline in the total economic activity. Compared to the BAU 
scenario, Turkey’s total import volume also decreases from $151.556 billion 
to $151.122 billion, under NP_rETS scenario. Compared to the NOACT 
scenario, total imports also show a decreasing trend. Total commodity 
import volume continues to decline as the cutback ratio increases. It is 
crucial to note here also the changes in bilateral import patterns. Although 
Turkey starts to import less under comprehensive permit market, the data 
reveals that compared to NOACT scenario, Turkey’s imports from the 
European Union increases. The decrease in total import volume is mainly 
due to the decrease in imports from the rest of the world aggregate. In 
essence, Turkey’s imports from the European Union increases from $79.776 
billion to $79.881 billion under comprehensive permit market with 10% 
cutback, to $79.914 billion under 15% quota and to $79.949 billion under 20% 
quota. Thus, imports from the EU start to get a bigger share in total imports 
as the total cutback requirement increases. That is to say European industries 
become more competitive in the Turkish domestic market.  
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Table 5.10: Commodity trade volumes under NP_rETS scenario  
(billion 2004 USD) 
P
ar
tn
er
2020 NOACT
NP_rETS
10%
NP_rETS
15%
NP_rETS
20%
Import 151.556 151.471 151.122 151.015 150.896
EU 80.175 79.776 79.881 79.914 79.949
ROW 71.381 71.695 71.241 71.101 70.947
Export 170.417 170.006 169.157 168.828 168.424
EU 93.213 93.401 93.069 92.946 92.797
ROW 77.204 76.606 76.088 75.882 75.627
Import 5424.642 5413.773 5413.881 5413.925 5413.980
TUR 93.213 93.401 93.069 92.946 92.797
EU 3272.763 3262.299 3262.432 3262.484 3262.546
ROW 2058.666 2058.074 2058.380 2058.495 2058.637
Export 5492.980 5459.323 5459.395 5459.417 5459.441
TUR 80.175 79.776 79.881 79.914 79.949
EU 3272.763 3262.299 3262.432 3262.484 3262.546
ROW 2140.042 2117.249 2117.081 2117.020 2116.946
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Source: Author’s computations. 
There exist two separate channels through which the EU economy is 
affected by Turkey’s abatement policies. Firstly, permit price levels both in 
the European ETS and non ETS markets are subject to certain levels of 
changes depending on Turkey’s domestic abatement policies. The decrease 
in Turkey’s total demand for fossil fuels affects the international price levels 
of fossil fuels. The spillover of this effect is definitely dependent on the scale 
of the Turkish economy and how dependent it is to fossil fuels. While 
Turkish economy is highly dependent on fossil fuel imports, the scale of 
Turkish economy remains small compared to the other regions, i.e. the EU 
and the rest of the world. Therefore, it is not straightforward to conclude any 
positive or negative net effect on fossil fuel prices. In addition to that, the 
product heterogeneity in international trade further causes Turkey to pass on 
some of its cost burden to its trading partners including the EU. Therefore, 
the total net effect on the marginal cost structure of the EU industries has to 
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be determined in a general equilibrium framework in order to get robust 
results out of policy simulations. The other channel affecting the EU 
economies is the change in competitiveness in international markets due to 
loss of competitiveness of Turkish industries. The ability of the EU to turn 
Turkey’s disadvantage in international competitiveness into gains is very 
much dependent on the production technologies and also on the openness to 
trade.  
The permit price in the EU ETS market increases from $17.73 per ton of 
CO2 to $17.76, $17.77, $17.78 under 10%, 15% and 20% quota, respectively. 
International fossil fuel prices slightly decreases compared to the levels 
under NOACT scenario. However, it is mainly the foregone opportunity of 
importing cheaper secondary energy carriers from Turkey, which underlies 
the increase in ETS permit price levels. Higher energy prices in the EU 
further affects non ETS sectors, too. The marginal abatement cost of 
European non ETS sectors also increase. The price level in non ETS market 
increases from $84.19 per ton of CO2 to $84.24 under 10% quota and it further 
reaches to $84.3, under 20% quota.  
Despite the increase in abatement costs, sector output data in Table 5.21 
reveals that European sectors, except for natural gas, coal, crude oil, 
transport and other manufacturing, increase their scale of productions. 
Regarding the fossil fuel sectors, the EU becomes more reliant on its imports 
from the rest of the world aggregate due to cheaper energy prices. When we 
look at Table 5.10, we see that total commodity imports increases from 
$5413.773 billion to $5413.881 billion with 10% cutback. As Turkey applies 
higher cutback ratios, the EU’s imports continue to rise until $5413.980 
billion with 20% quota. The biggest portion of this rise is due to the increase 
in fuel imports from the rest of the world aggregate. The positive scale 
effects on the rest of the sectors stem from the loss of competitiveness of 
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Turkish industries which results in increasing competitiveness of European 
sectors in international markets. Table 5.9 summarizes the EU’s GDP levels 
for different cutback ratios under NP_rETS scenario. In comparison with 
NOACT scenario, we see that total economic activity in the EU increases. The 
GDP level of $16828.295 billion, under no abatement case, increases to 
$16828.409 billion with 10% quota, to $16828.459 billion with 15% quota and 
to $16828.523 billion with 20% quota. The increase in GDP level of the EU, in 
relation to the increase in total cutback ratio, points out the fact that positive 
scale effects on the EU economy increases as Turkish sector lose more of 
their competitiveness in the international markets.  
Total commodity export volume of the European economy also rises 
following the economic growth. As Table 5.10 gives, the EU economy 
increases its commodity exports from $5459.323 billion to $5459.395 billion 
under 10% quota, to $5459.417 billion under 15% quota and $5459.441 billion 
under 20% quota. However, as the data suggests, the increase in total exports 
does not necessarily mean that bilateral exports with each trading partner 
increases, too. The EU’s total export volume to the rest of the world 
decreases from $2117.249 billion to $2117.081 billion under 10% quota. As the 
cutback ratio increases, the decrease in total exports to the ROW continues to 
decrease. On the other hand, the EU’s exports to Turkey show an increasing 
trend. Under no abatement case, total exports to Turkey happen to be 
$79.776 billion. When Turkey applies comprehensive permit trading, total 
exports increases to $79.881 billion under 10% quota, to $79.914 billion under 
15% quota and to $79.949 billion under 20% quota. These findings clearly 
show that the European industries become more competitive especially in 
the Turkish and also in the European domestic markets.  
Positive scale effects on the EU’s economic activity result in increasing 
factor demands. Depending on that, factor prices also rise. Increasing 
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auctioning revenues due to higher permit price levels and also increasing 
factor prices lead to increase in the total income level. In comparison to BAU 
income level, the increase is around 0.56%, while the change in CPI is 0.94%. 
These lead to changes in the EU’s welfare, as seen in Figure 5.1. Compared to 
the BAU case, the EU still suffers from welfare losses, which is quantified 
around 0.377%. However, the loss is strictly smaller than the one that the EU 
would suffer under NOACT scenario. Hence, the EU has some welfare gain 
when Turkey applies abatement policies countrywide and this gain increases 
as Turkey applies more strict abatement limitations.  
5.6. P_rETS: Partitioned Regional ETS Market 
Under partitioned permit trading regime, the national permit market of 
Turkey is segmented into two, i.e. ETS sectors and non ETS sectors. Total 
allowances to each segment are allocated ex ante trading. The allocation 
across ETS and non ETS sectors are made based on the percentages of the 
emission levels in the hypothetical BAU scenario. Table 5.11 gives the 
distribution of allowances under the corresponding cutback requirements. 
Table 5.11: CO2 emission profile under P_rETS scenario 
(Mt of CO2) 
C
O
2
E
m
is
si
on
s
2020 NOACT
P_rETS
10%
P_rETS
15%
P_rETS
20%
Total 219.074 220.200 182.014 171.902 161.790
ETS Sectors 115.887 116.398 87.886 83.003 78.121
non ETS Sectors 103.187 103.802 94.128 88.898 83.669
Total 3969.096 3368.937 3368.937 3368.937 3368.937
ETS Sectors 1848.408 1433.304 1433.304 1433.304 1433.304
non ETS Sectors 2120.688 1935.633 1935.633 1935.633 1935.633
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U
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Source: Author’s computations. 
In comparison of Table 5.11 with Table 5.8, the allocation of permits 
across ETS and non ETS sectors shows some differences. For the 10% cutback 
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requirement, ETS sectors are assigned 87.886 Mt of CO2 under P_rETS. This 
is less than the amount 88.053 Mt of CO2, which is the efficient allocation 
amount under NP_rETS. That is to say in such a scheme, ETS sectors are 
obliged to abate more than what they would abate under a comprehensive 
trading scheme. Following the increase in abatement amount, the permit 
price level that ETS sectors face under P_rETS scenario increases to $20.09 
from $19.9 per ton of CO2. Regarding the non ETS sectors, while they are 
assigned 93.961 Mt of CO2 under NP_rETS scenario, this amount raises to 
94.128 Mt of CO2 under partitioned permit market regime. Thus, MAC of 
non ETS sectors becomes $19.42 per ton of CO2. The abatement cost at the 
margin decreases compared to NP_rETS case. 
Under 15% and 20% cutback requirements, over allocation is observed in 
ETS sectors, i.e. they are assigned more allowances than the efficient amount. 
In opposed to that, non ETS sectors are given less amounts of allowances 
compared to the efficient allocation. Needless to mention, the gap between 
the efficient allocations and the actual allocations widen as the cutback ratio 
increases. The efficiency loss arising from over allocating to ETS sectors and 
under allocating to non ETS sectors is further reflected in the MACs, as they 
are seen in Table 5.7. In the ETS market, allowance price drops down to 
$26.63 and $34.91, under 15% and 20% quota, respectively. The price level 
increases following the increase in total quota, since more of the abatement 
burden cause each unit of abatement at the margin to be more costly. In the 
non ETS market, allowance price increases to $38.39 and $67.55, under 15% 
and 20% quota, respectively. 
In the aforementioned trading scheme with segmented market structure 
and permit allocations done in proportion to the BAU levels of emissions, the 
Turkish economy experiences efficiency losses in meeting its total abatement 
objectives. Separating the market basically causes shifts in sharing the 
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abatement cost burden between sectors. Under the cutback ratios of 15% and 
20%, ETS sectors shift some of their abatement duties to non ETS sectors. 
That is to say, non ETS sectors abate on behalf of ETS sectors. Hence, the 
permit price level that ETS sectors face falls, while permit price that non ETS 
sectors face rises. In opposed to that, distribution of burden sharing shows a 
different pattern under 10% quota. ETS sectors are obliged to abate more, 
while non ETS sectors are obliged to abate less. The difference in the 
behaviors of MACs under different cutback schedules clearly points out the 
interdependencies between abatement cost structures of sectors.   
Table 5.12: Real GDP under P_rETS scenario  
(billion 2004 USD) 
2004 2020
P_rETS
10%
P_rETS
15%
P_rETS
20%
Turkey 296.255 513.982 512.806 511.892 510.574
EU 12938.300 16868.932 16828.410 16828.446 16828.487
Source: Author’s computations. 
Table 5.20 gives the changes in output levels with fixed 2004 prices. 
Under P_rETS scenario, except for the transport sector, all sectors decrease 
their level of outputs compared to BAU levels. Needless to mention, this is 
mainly because of abatement actions, which put extra costs on the 
production. Therefore, it is also crucial to look at the changes relative to the 
levels under NP_rETS scenario in order to compare relative efficiencies of 
both market schemes. Under a partitioned market with 10% total cap, ETS 
sectors, except for oil, i.e. paper-pulp-print, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, 
iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and electricity sectors, decrease their scale 
of productions. Non ETS sectors, such as textiles, transport and other 
manufacturing industries increase their scale of productions in a partitioned 
market. The ETS sectors, formerly mentioned, are the ones that carry the 
abatement cost burden stemming from the expansions of these non ETS 
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sectors. Under P_rETS scenario with 15% and 20% quota, the ETS sectors, i.e. 
paper-pulp-print, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, iron and steel, non-
ferrous metals and electricity increase their scale of productions. The 
decrease in total abatement amounts in the ETS sectors are compensated by 
the non ETS sectors, i.e. textiles, other manufacturing industries, crude oil 
works and transport services. These sectors decrease their scale of 
productions considerably.  
When we look at Table 5.12 and compare GDP levels under NP_rETS and 
P_rETS scenarios, we see that GDP increases from $512.800 billion to 
$512.806 billion with 10% quota. The efficiency loss from partitioning the 
markets does not result in an absolute output cost. However, with 15% and 
20% quota, GDP level decreases to $511.892 billion and to $510.574 billion, 
respectively. Hence, efficiency loss is more pronounced in terms of output 
loss when the total cap increases and the price differentials between ETS and 
non ETS markets widen.  
Table 5.13: Comparison table for commodity exports 
10% 15% 20%
NP_rETS 169.157 168.828 168.424
P_rETS 169.165 168.698 168.081
EU_ETS 169.226 168.912 168.462
NP_rETS 5459.395 5459.417 5459.441
P_rETS 5459.397 5459.382 5459.347
EU_ETS 5459.308 5459.075 5458.813
T
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Source: Author’s computations. 
Compared to the NP_rETS scenario, Turkey’s total commodity export 
and import volumes change in a similar fashion to the changes in the GDP 
level. Total exports rise to $169.165 billion under 10% caps. Table 5.13 shows 
that as the caps increase, export volume continues to fall behind the realized 
levels under comprehensive trading scheme.   
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Table 5.14: Commodity trade volumes under P_rETS scenario  
(billion 2004 USD) 
P
ar
tn
er
2020 NOACT
P_rETS
10%
P_rETS
15%
P_rETS
20%
Import 151.556 151.471 151.124 150.978 150.798
EU 80.175 79.776 79.882 79.908 79.929
ROW 71.381 71.695 71.243 71.071 70.869
Export 170.417 170.006 169.165 168.698 168.081
EU 93.213 93.401 93.074 92.863 92.585
ROW 77.204 76.606 76.091 75.835 75.496
Import 5424.642 5413.773 5413.884 5413.873 5413.845
TUR 93.213 93.401 93.074 92.863 92.585
EU 3272.763 3262.299 3262.432 3262.480 3262.535
ROW 2058.666 2058.074 2058.377 2058.531 2058.725
Export 5492.980 5459.323 5459.397 5459.382 5459.347
TUR 80.175 79.776 79.882 79.908 79.929
EU 3272.763 3262.299 3262.432 3262.480 3262.535
ROW 2140.042 2117.249 2117.083 2116.994 2116.883
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Source: Author’s computations. 
Total commodity imports of Turkey increases to $151.124 billion with 
10% emission target when compared with the level under NP_rETS scenario, 
which is $151.122 billion. However, under 15% and 20% caps, total imports 
decline under partitioned market regime. Table 5.15 gives the related data in 
comparison with the data from other scenarios.  
Table 5.15: Comparison table for commodity imports 
10% 15% 20%
NP_rETS 151.122 151.015 150.896
P_rETS 151.124 150.978 150.798
EU_ETS 151.126 150.981 150.799
NP_rETS 5413.881 5413.925 5413.980
P_rETS 5413.884 5413.873 5413.845
EU_ETS 5413.848 5413.746 5413.616
T
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Source: Author’s computations. 
As Table 5.23 outlays, compared to the BAU levels, severe declines in 
imports of fossil fuels, especially coal imports, are accompanied by 
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significant increases in imports of electricity. The imports of electricity 
further increase following the increase in CO2 cutback requirements. On the 
other hand, imports of energy intensive sector goods, such as chemicals, 
non-metallic minerals, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and other 
manufacturing sectors, also increases. Regarding the exports, it is only the 
transport services that Turkey continues to export under partitioned permit 
trading applications. However, the amount of transport exports steadily 
continue to decrease as the cutback ratio increases.  
The change in the level of disposable income, compared to BAU level, is 
read as 0.05%, 0.07% and 0.1%, for 10%, 15% and 20% quota, respectively. 
CPI increases by 0.35% when total quota is 10%. Higher CO2 quotas result in 
higher CPI levels. The total change in Turkey’s welfare is given in Figure 5.2. 
Under the partitioned market regime, Turkey suffers from welfare losses. 
Under 10% quota, the loss is 0.30%, while it increases to 0.54% and 0.88% 
under 15% and 20% quota, respectively. In comparison with comprehensive 
permit market, partitioned market structure results in more welfare loss. 
That is to say, the higher the cutback requirement, the higher the cost burden 
on cleaner industries, relative to the cost burden on energy intensive sectors. 
The resulting high price differential between the MACs of ETS and non ETS 
sectors cause efficiency losses. The same amount of cutback in CO2 emissions 
costs more under a partitioned scheme than a comprehensive trading 
scheme.   
 When Turkey applies permit trading in a partitioned market 
structure, the MACs of European ETS and non ETS sectors are affected 
simultaneously. In comparison to the NOACT scenario, the permit price in 
the EU ETS market increases from $17.73 to $17.76 under 10% quota, $17.77 
under 15% quota and $17.78 under 20% quota. At the same time, the MACs 
of the EU’s non ETS sectors also increase from $84.19 to $84.24 under 10% 
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quota, to $84.29 under 15% quota and to $84.37 under 20% quota. However, 
when the prevailing permit price levels are compared to the levels under 
NP_rETS scenario, it is seen that ETS permit price is not affected by the 
market segmentation, while non ETS permit price increases under 15% and 
20% quota.  
The increase in marginal abatement costs, ceteris paribus, is expected to 
cause decreases in the economic activity level of the EU. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to see that GDP level of the EU falls behind its BAU level. When 
comparison is done based on NOACT scenario, despite the increase in MAC 
levels, the EU still finds it profitable that Turkey applies CO2 abatement in a 
partitioned market structure. This is mainly due to the fact that European 
industries gain comparative advantages in domestic and also Turkish 
markets. This is clearly seen in Table 5.14 from the increasing export 
volumes of the EU in Turkish and European markets. However, the EU loses 
competitiveness in the world markets due to the increasing marginal costs of 
production. The EU’s export volume to the world markets decreases 
gradually from $2117.083 billion under 10% quota to $2116.883 billion under 
20% quota. Meanwhile, the EU’s exports to Turkey keeps increasing from 
$79.882 billion with 10% cap to $79.929 billion with 20% cap. Hence, the EU 
industries manage to stay more competitive in the Turkish domestic 
markets. Hence, in terms of the overall economic activity, as Table 5.12 
summarizes, the EU’s GDP increases from $16828.295 billion under NOACT 
scenario to $16828.410 billion under P_rETS with 10% quota, further to 
$16828.446 billion and $16828.487 billion under 15% and 20% quota, 
respectively. That is to say the EU benefits more as the cutback ratio that 
Turkey applies increases.  
In comparison with NP_rETS scenario, the EU’s total economic activity 
level increases when Turkey applies 10% cap. Taking into account the fact 
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that MACs of European sectors do not change, it is clear that this increase is 
mainly due to the efficiency loss in Turkish economy arising from market 
segmentation. Hence, as it is seen in Table 5.14, the EU’s exports increase to 
$5459.397 billion. This is mainly due to the increase in the EU’s bilateral 
export volumes with Turkey and within the EU. In opposed to this, under 
15% and 20% quota, GDP level decreases from $16828.459 billion to 
$16828.446 billion and from $16828.523 billion to $16828.487 billion, 
respectively. This decrease in the total output is mainly due to the relative 
increase in the marginal production costs of European sectors, accompanied 
with decreasing market share in Turkish domestic markets.  
Change in the EU’s economic welfare is given in Figure 5.1. In 
comparison to the case where the EU takes unilateral abatement action, the 
EU has some welfare gains when Turkey applies domestic abatement 
actions. However, the EU enjoys more welfare gains under comprehensive 
permit trading, compared to the partitioned permit trading.  
5.7. EU_ETS: The European Union ETS market 
Turkey’s integration with the EU ETS market affects the economies of 
both parties. The permit price level in the ETS market is supposed to be 
affected depending on the relative marginal cost structures of the potential 
permit exporters and importers in the market. MACs of non ETS sectors are 
also affected by these changes via energy prices. What we see in Table 5.3 is 
that the permit price in the EU ETS market increases from $17.73 to $17.90 
under 10% quota, to $18.24 under 15% quota and to $18.59 under 20% quota. 
In comparison to the permit price levels revealed in regional ETS markets, 
Turkish ETS sectors face considerable decrease in the price level after 
integration. The price differential, between the EU ETS and the regional ETS 
markets, gets more significant as the total cap increases. It is also crucial to 
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note that while permit price level in regional ETS markets are more volatile 
against changes in total cap amounts, the price level in the EU ETS market is 
less volatile against domestic policy changes.  
Table 5.16: CO2 emission profile under EU_ETS scenario  
(Mt of CO2) 
CO2
Emissions
2020 NOACT
EU_ETS
10%
EU_ETS
15%
EU_ETS
20%
Total 219.074 220.200 183.996 178.641 173.300
ETS Sectors 115.887 116.398 89.869 89.743 89.631
non ETS Sectors 103.187 103.802 94.128 88.898 83.669
Total 3969.096 3368.937 3366.955 3362.198 3357.427
ETS Sectors 1848.408 1433.304 1431.322 1426.565 1421.794
non ETS Sectors 2120.688 1935.633 1935.633 1935.633 1935.633
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Source: Author’s computations. 
In comparison to what Turkey experiences under integration, ETS sectors 
in the EU face higher permit price levels. While the permit price in the EU 
ETS market under NOACT scenario is $17.73 per ton of CO2, under the 
EU_ETS scenario, it realizes as $17.9 under 10% quota, as $18.24 under 15% 
quota and as $18.59 under 20% quota. This increase is mainly because of high 
level of MACs of the Turkish ETS sectors, which are summarized in Table 
5.7. High levels of MACs lead Turkey to buy permits in the market place 
instead of abating at home, while European ETS sectors have the incentive to 
sell permits in exchange of decreasing their emission levels. Thus, in the EU 
ETS market, Turkey becomes a permit importer, while the EU becomes a 
permit exporter. In other words, Turkey shifts some of its abatement cost 
burden to the EU via international permit trading.  
The amounts of permits imported and exported are summarized in Table 
5.16. While the total allowances allocated to the EU ETS sectors is 1433.304 
Mt of CO2, the actual emissions from ETS sectors after trading are measured 
as 1431.322 Mt of CO2 under 10% quota, 1426.565 Mt of CO2 under 15% quota 
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and 1421.794 Mt of CO2 under 20% quota. The difference between the initial 
allocations and the realized emission levels is the amount of permits that are 
imported by Turkish ETS sectors in the EU ETS market. Total permit imports 
of Turkey become 1.983 Mt of CO2 under 10% quota, 6.739 Mt of CO2 and 
11.510 Mt of CO2 under 15% and 20% quota, respectively. Permit imports 
increase as the cap increases due to increasing levels of MACs of Turkish 
ETS sectors. 
In comparison to the P_rETS scenario, the output levels of Turkish ETS 
sectors increase following the decrease in their marginal production costs. As 
Table 5.20 shows, the increase in the output levels of secondary energy 
productions, iron and steel industry, non-ferrous metals, chemicals and non-
metallic minerals industries are significant. Due to decreasing energy prices, 
the marginal abatement costs of non ETS sectors in Turkey also tend to 
decrease. MACs of these sectors are given as $19.38 per ton of CO2 under 
10% cap, $38.27 per ton of CO2 under 15% cap and $67.46 per ton of CO2 
under 20% cap. Thus, some non ETS sectors, i.e. natural gas, mining, textile, 
coal and crude oil, also increase their scale of productions. The rest of the 
non ETS sectors experience decline in their activity levels due to their loss of 
competitiveness in the world markets. Despite these negative scale effects, as 
Table 5.17 shows, in comparison the P_rETS scenario, Turkey’s GDP 
increases from $512.806 to $512.910 billion under 10% cap, from $511.892 to 
$512.291 billion under 15% cap and from $510.574 to $511.342 billion under 
20% cap. It is crucial to note that the realized GDP levels of the Turkish 
economy under EU_ETS scenario are also higher than the levels that realize 
under comprehensive regional ETS regime. Therefore, although it is 
inevitable for Turkey not to have certain levels of output cost as a result of its 
abatement policies, it is seen that this cost is also manageable via different 
market formulations. In that regard, Turkey has certainly benefits out of 
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integrating with the EU ETS market, compared to the other domestic permit 
trading formulations. 
Table 5.17: Real GDP under EU_ETS scenario  
(billion 2004 USD) 
2004 2020
EU_ETS
10%
EU_ETS
15%
EU_ETS
20%
Turkey 296.255 513.982 512.910 512.291 511.342
EU 12938.300 16868.932 16828.346 16828.223 16828.096
Source: Author’s computations. 
Bilateral commodity export and import volumes are given in Table 5.19. 
In comparison with P_rETS scenario, Turkey’s total exports and imports 
increase, regardless of the total cap. Turkey starts to import more from the 
rest of the world aggregate and less from the European Union. Turkey’s 
commodity exports to both the European Union and the rest of the world 
increases.  
Factor prices in the Turkish factor markets increase relative to their levels 
under domestic abatement actions. This is mainly because of the increase in 
factor demands as a result of the increase in total economic activity. The 
increase in income level with respect to the BAU level is quantified as 0.074% 
with 10% quota, 0.165% with 15% quota and 0.303% with 20% quota. While 
these levels of change in income level are definitely smaller than the levels 
under NOACT scenario, they are higher than the levels under P_rETS and 
NP_rETS scenarios. The increase in income levels cannot be directly 
translated into increased levels of welfare. This is due to the fact that total 
welfare change depends also on the change in CPI levels. The change in CPI 
level is quantified as 0.36% with 10% quota, 0.63% with 15% quota and 1.03% 
with 20% quota. Hence, the welfare change of Turkish economy under the 
EU ETS regime is translated as a welfare loss compared to the BAU welfare 
level. The welfare loss, relative to the BAU level, is calculated as 0.29% with 
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10% quota, 0.46% with 15% quota and 0.73% with 20% quota. However, as 
Figure 5.2 shows, in comparison with P_rETS and NP_rETS scenarios, 
Turkey has welfare gains in integrating with the EU ETS market.  
Despite the improvement in Turkey’s economic welfare, it is clear that 
Turkey is worse off in terms of its environmental standards. In comparison 
of Table 5.16 with Table 5.11, it is seen that Turkey’s CO2 emissions increase 
under EU_ETS scenario. This is mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, the 
increase in the scale of the Turkish economy results in certain level of 
increase in Turkey’s total emission level. Secondly, due to the relative 
decrease in the marginal costs of CO2 intense production factors in Turkey, 
some of the Turkish sectors have tendency to use more CO2 intense 
production procedures. As Table 5.24 shows, in comparison to the domestic 
permit trading cases, the CO2 intensity of the Turkish economy increases 
under EU_ETS scenario. The CO2 intensity is reported as 0.359 Mt CO2 per 
2004 USD under 10% quota. The intensity further drops to 0.349 and 0.339 
under 15% and 20% quota, respectively, due to the increase in abatement 
burden.  
According to the sector output data given in Table 5.21, under EU_ETS 
scenario, all ETS sectors in the EU decrease their scale of productions. This is 
mainly due to the burden sharing between Turkey and the EU as a result of 
Turkey’s abatement actions. While Turkish ETS sectors are expanding their 
scale of productions at a cost of increasing emissions, the EU abates more at 
a cost of decreasing ETS production levels.  
The spillover effects are not limited to just European ETS sectors. As 
Table 5.7 revels, with respect to the BAU scenario, marginal abatement cost 
of non ETS sectors also increases under EU_ETS scenario. The MAC level in 
European non ETS market, compared to the NOACT scenario, increase from 
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$84.19 to $84.23 with 10% quota, to $84.27 with 15% quota, and to $84.33 
with 20% quota. It is crucial to note here that the relative changes in MAC 
levels of non ETS sectors show some differences in comparison with 
domestic abatement cases. Under P_rETS scenario, regardless of the total 
cap, MACs are higher and under NP_rETS scenario, they are lower. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the EU industries become highly dependent on 
secondary energy imports from Turkey as a result of the EU’s 20-20-20 
abatement targets. Due to expensive electricity imports from Turkey under 
P_rETS scenario, the permit price in European non ETS market increases 
more compared to NP_rETS scenario. When Turkey integrates with the EU 
ETS market, the expansion in Turkey’s secondary energy sectors lead to 
cheaper import prices; hence MACs of European non ETS sectors decrease 
compared to P_rETS scenario. As it is given in Table 5.21, it is only in the 
European transport, other manufacturing and other economy sectors that we 
see expansions in scale of productions. 
When we look at the EU’s total economic activity in Table 5.17, we see 
that there is an increase in GDP in comparison to the NOACT scenario under 
10% cap. Thus, even Turkey’s integration with the EU ETS market imposes 
extra cost burden both on European ETS and non ETS sectors, the EU still 
finds it profitable that Turkey applies 10% abatement. However, as the cap 
rises to 15% and more to 20%, the permit price levels prevailing in European 
ETS and non ETS sectors increase, widening the price differential between 
these two groups of sectors. Therefore, the EU’s GDP falls below its level 
under NOACT scenario. In that regard, from the EU’s perspective, Turkey’s 
total cap amount is highly critical.  
Looking at Table 5.18, we also see that the EU’s GDP always decreases 
under EU_ETS scenario in comparison to P_rETS and NP_rETS scenarios. 
That is to say that Turkey’s domestic abatement actions always give output 
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gain to the EU via the positive terms of trade effects. Therefore, taking the 
level of total economic activity as the choice criteria, the EU should favor that 
Turkey establishes national permit markets in reaching its abatement targets. 
However, regarding the integration of Turkish national permit market with 
the EU ETS market, the EU should take it with more precaution due to the 
negative scale effects of high cutback requirements. High levels of permit 
prices due to high levels of caps can wipe out the positive terms of trade 
effects on the EU economy that would otherwise occur under the cases 
where Turkey applies domestic permit trading schemes. 
Table 5.18: Comparison table for total economic activity 
10% 15% 20%
NP_rETS 512.800 512.010 510.938
P_rETS 512.806 511.892 510.574
EU_ETS 512.910 512.291 511.342
NP_rETS 16828.409 16828.459 16828.523
P_rETS 16828.410 16828.446 16828.487
EU_ETS 16828.346 16828.223 16828.096
T
u
rk
ey
E
U
 
Source: Author’s computations. 
Moving from NOACT case to the EU_ETS case under 10% quota, the EU 
increases the level of its total economic activity. Following that, as Table 5.19 
shows, total imports of the EU increases while total exports decreases. The 
reason underlying the decreasing exports is that industries of the rest of the 
world aggregate become more competitive than European industries in the 
world markets. Hence, the EU’s import volume from the rest of the world 
increases, while export volume decreases. On the other hand, the EU 
industries start to get higher shares of export sales in the Turkish domestic 
markets. However, under 15% and 20% quota, as a direct result of the 
decline in the total economic activity, total imports and exports of the EU fall 
behind their levels under the NOACT scenario. In comparison with P_rETS 
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and NP_rETS scenarios, regardless of the total quota, total commodity 
exports and imports of the EU decline. 
Table 5.19: Commodity trade volumes under EU_ETS scenario  
(billion 2004 USD) 
P
ar
tn
er
2020 NOACT
EU_ETS
10%
EU_ETS
15%
EU_ETS
20%
Import 151.556 151.471 151.126 150.981 150.799
EU 80.175 79.776 79.866 79.851 79.829
ROW 71.381 71.695 71.260 71.129 70.970
Export 170.417 170.006 169.226 168.912 168.462
EU 93.213 93.401 93.096 92.938 92.714
ROW 77.204 76.606 76.130 75.974 75.748
Import 5424.642 5413.773 5413.848 5413.746 5413.616
TUR 93.213 93.401 93.096 92.938 92.714
EU 3272.763 3262.299 3262.395 3262.349 3262.306
ROW 2058.666 2058.074 2058.357 2058.458 2058.597
Export 5492.980 5459.323 5459.308 5459.075 5458.813
TUR 80.175 79.776 79.866 79.851 79.829
EU 3272.763 3262.299 3262.395 3262.349 3262.306
ROW 2140.042 2117.249 2117.048 2116.875 2116.678
T
u
rk
ey
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 U
n
io
n
Source: Author’s computations. 
Change in overall economic activity directly affects factor input demands. 
Compared to their BAU levels, the EU factor prices decrease and this 
decrease becomes more pronounced as the total cap increases. The change in 
income level, relative to the BAU level, is quantified as 0.556% under 10%, 
0.558% under 15% and 0.560% under 20% quota. Despite the decrease in 
factor income, what we see here is that there is an increase in the level of 
income, which is due to the increased revenues from auctioning permits. It is 
not surprising that the income from auctioning increases, when the permit 
price levels both in ETS and in non ETS markets increase.  
The CPI level also increases, in comparison to the BAU level. The increase 
is quantified by 0.9369% under 10% caps, 0.9392% under 15% caps and 
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0.9421% under 20% caps. The change in both income and CPI level affects 
the overall welfare. Figure 5.1 graphically shows the changes in the EU’s 
welfare. The EU’s welfare loss increases under EU_ETS scenario when 
compared to the P_rETS and NP_rETS scenarios. The higher the total cap is 
the higher the welfare loss is. However, it is crucial to note that the 
quantified welfare loss under EU_ETS scenario is less than the welfare loss 
that the EU suffers under NOACT scenario. In that regard, the EU should 
favor any of permit trading schemes that Turkey applies, i.e. domestic or 
international.  
Referring back to the previous findings on the EU’s output loss under 
EU_ETS scenario, this result may seem to be contradictory. In terms of the 
change in total output, it is shown that the EU should not favor Turkey’s 
integration with the EU ETS market under 15% and 20% caps. The 
underlying reason is that as a permit exporter in the ETS market, the EU 
suffers from high permit prices in its permit markets and is affected by 
negative terms of trade effects in the world markets. However, the welfare 
analysis argues that the EU has welfare gains under EU_ETS scenario, in 
comparison with the NOACT scenario. The main reason underlying this 
welfare gain is mainly the revenues from permit trading. Despite the output 
loss, the EU has additional income from permit trading which is transferred 
lump sum to the representative agent in the model formulation and further 
used for the consumption. Hence, international permit trading becomes 
welfare enhancing for both trading parties, Turkey and the EU.   
In terms of environmental standards, the EU is definitely better off under 
EU_ETS scenario. The European Union’s CO2 emission level decreases when 
Turkey integrates with the EU ETS market, which is mainly due to the 
burden sharing between Turkey and the EU. It is not only the fact that the 
EU becomes a permit exporter which underlies the decrease in the EU’s 
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emission level. As Table 5.24 shows, the increase in the abatement cost 
burden on the EU economy further gives incentives on the European sectors 
to use less CO2 intense factors in their production processes. Hence, in 
comparison to the other scenarios, the European economy transforms into a 
less carbon-intense economy under EU_ETS scenario.  
5.8. Concluding Comments 
This chapter employs the MR-ETPA model in analyzing the economic 
impacts of establishing permit trading market in Turkey and further 
investigating the impacts under international cooperation with the EU, via 
EU ETS market. The counterfactual scenarios mainly focus on the effects of 
various emission cutback requirements, on the importance of the market 
segmentation in implementing these targets and, finally, on the effects of 
pursuing cooperation with the EU in carbon trading.  
 In the analysis, I find that Turkey suffers from welfare losses in case of 
regional comprehensive permit trading and these losses tend to grow larger 
as the total cutback ratio increases. On the other hand, Turkey definitely has 
environmental benefits in terms of decreasing CO2 emissions and CO2 
intensity. From the EU’s perspective, Turkey’s engagement in permit trading 
is always preferable as it gives the EU welfare gains compared to the case 
where the EU continues to apply its abatement actions without any 
international cooperation. The improvement in the EU’s welfare is mainly 
dependent on the total output growth due to increased competitiveness of 
the EU industries in the world markets. As Turkey sets higher cutback ratios, 
the EU’s welfare gain gradually increases.   
 Turkey starts to suffer from market segmentation more as the total 
cap increases. This is mainly due to the increasing price differential between 
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marginal abatement costs of sectors belonging to different market segments. 
Hence, total compliance cost of meeting the same amount of cap increases. 
The EU’s welfare gains from Turkey’s regional permit trading applications 
also decreases when market segmentation exists. This is the direct effect of 
both decreasing import demand from Turkey and also increasing marginal 
abatement costs of some of the European industries due to trade linkages.    
 In case of Turkey’s integration with the EU ETS market, regardless of 
the total abatement ratio, Turkey is definitely better off compared to 
domestic abatement actions. As a permit importer, Turkey finds 
opportunities to increase its total output by shifting its abatement burden to 
the EU. As a result, Turkey experiences considerable expansions in its energy 
and energy intensive sectors that are integrated with the EU carbon market. 
This also has further spillover effects on Turkish economy, too. Depressed 
marginal abatement costs of energy and energy intensive sectors have 
positive spillover effects on other non-energy sectors via cheaper energy 
prices. Therefore, Turkey becomes better off under the EU ETS due to the 
economic growth. On the other hand, in terms of environmental 
degradation, Turkey becomes worse off. This is mainly due to the burden 
sharing via permit trading. Turkey, as a permit importer, finds it more 
profitable to shift its abatement burden to the EU, which further increases 
the level of Turkey’s emissions and also the incentives to shift to more 
emission intense production procedures.   
From the EU’s perspective, Turkey’s integration with the EU ETS is 
preferable regarding the environmental concerns, as the emission levels and 
intensities decrease. However, in terms of economic welfare it is not that 
straightforward. Compared to the current situation where Turkey does not 
take any abatement action, the EU should definitely prefer Turkey’s 
integration with the EU ETS market based on the economic welfare concerns. 
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However, as a permit exporter, the total cap that Turkey assigns to its ETS 
and non ETS sectors becomes highly critical for the European Union. The 
analysis shows that as the cap increases, the EU’s output loss increases and 
welfare gains decreases. Another critical issue from the EU’s perspective is 
how sustainable the permit trading with Turkey will be. As the analysis 
shows, the EU compensates some of its output loss with the extra income 
from permit trading. While this is a reasonable policy for the short run, in the 
long run, the EU should definitely pilot and implement policies to recycle 
these permit revenues in such a way that also compensates for the output 
loss.    
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Table 5.20: Sector outputs in Turkey  
(billion 2004 USD) 
Sectors 2020 NOACT NP_rETS P_rETS EU_ETS NP_rETS P_rETS EU_ETS NP_rETS P_rETS EU_ETS
oil 8.027 8.072 7.939 7.941 7.946 7.875 7.846 7.865 7.789 7.709 7.745
gas 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.039
omn 4.564 4.559 4.523 4.522 4.526 4.508 4.514 4.529 4.490 4.505 4.532
tex 70.958 70.467 70.299 70.302 70.320 70.237 70.199 70.264 70.159 70.067 70.180
ppp 13.616 13.599 13.533 13.532 13.540 13.504 13.518 13.547 13.467 13.502 13.558
crp 24.426 24.450 23.732 23.725 23.801 23.424 23.532 23.815 23.032 23.305 23.838
nmm 18.091 18.064 17.783 17.780 17.810 17.673 17.718 17.826 17.540 17.650 17.850
i_s 30.243 30.180 29.402 29.395 29.478 29.084 29.198 29.506 28.688 28.975 29.550
nfm 2.321 2.334 2.007 2.005 2.036 1.883 1.922 2.036 1.735 1.829 2.038
ele 22.714 22.737 21.973 21.966 22.042 21.667 21.776 22.059 21.291 21.557 22.083
omf 121.397 120.605 120.546 120.550 120.550 120.550 120.501 120.498 120.572 120.474 120.460
COL 1.036 1.024 0.795 0.795 0.807 0.740 0.742 0.781 0.688 0.694 0.759
CRU 0.397 0.396 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.394 0.394 0.395 0.394 0.393 0.394
TRN 94.515 95.527 95.300 95.315 95.288 95.162 94.909 94.813 94.960 94.271 94.091
AOG 536.849 536.573 536.703 536.702 536.681 536.716 536.728 536.657 536.717 536.753 536.638
Turkey 10% 15% 20%
 Source: Author’s computations. 
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Table 5.21: Sector outputs in the European Union  
(billion 2004 USD) 
Sectors 2020 NOACT NP_rETS P_rETS EU_ETS NP_rETS P_rETS EU_ETS NP_rETS P_rETS EU_ETS
oil 289.373 276.943 276.945 276.945 276.940 276.945 276.945 276.929 276.946 276.946 276.919
gas 30.139 28.064 28.060 28.060 28.059 28.059 28.058 28.053 28.056 28.055 28.046
omn 89.800 89.024 89.038 89.038 89.035 89.043 89.040 89.030 89.049 89.042 89.023
tex 576.628 574.445 574.473 574.473 574.469 574.482 574.492 574.481 574.492 574.518 574.498
ppp 723.824 723.559 723.575 723.575 723.568 723.581 723.576 723.551 723.589 723.575 723.532
crp 1578.554 1572.943 1573.170 1573.173 1573.097 1573.268 1573.211 1572.941 1573.395 1573.251 1572.767
nmm 371.574 370.449 370.589 370.591 370.568 370.645 370.622 370.542 370.712 370.656 370.511
i_s 339.312 335.824 336.015 336.017 335.975 336.095 336.061 335.912 336.195 336.110 335.841
nfm 174.828 171.653 171.731 171.732 171.705 171.762 171.747 171.654 171.799 171.763 171.599
ele 453.745 441.910 441.932 441.933 441.854 441.943 441.939 441.670 441.956 441.948 441.485
omf 4771.793 4766.108 4765.746 4765.744 4765.760 4765.580 4765.603 4765.668 4765.363 4765.404 4765.536
COL 14.522 10.205 10.189 10.189 10.171 10.184 10.184 10.125 10.180 10.180 10.080
CRU 32.510 30.509 30.508 30.508 30.508 30.507 30.507 30.507 30.507 30.506 30.506
TRN 1809.129 1768.168 1768.117 1768.113 1768.127 1768.107 1768.178 1768.232 1768.103 1768.296 1768.398
AOG 20937.760 20954.633 20954.472 20954.471 20954.525 20954.405 20954.423 20954.614 20954.321 20954.364 20954.703
European Union 10% 15% 20%
 Source: Author’s computations. 
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Table 5.22: Commodity export volumes of Turkey  
(billion 2004 USD) 
TUR 2020 NOACT NP_rET
S
P_rETS EU_ETS NP_rET
S
P_rETS EU_ETS NP_rET
S
P_rETS EU_ETS
oil 0.786 0.785 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.776 0.775 0.776 0.772 0.769 0.771
omn 1.450 1.446 1.445 1.445 1.446 1.445 1.445 1.446 1.446 1.446 1.446
tex 40.972 40.621 40.514 40.515 40.527 40.476 40.449 40.490 40.428 40.364 40.434
ppp 1.106 1.098 1.087 1.087 1.088 1.082 1.084 1.089 1.076 1.082 1.091
crp 4.355 4.345 4.166 4.165 4.184 4.090 4.117 4.187 3.994 4.061 4.193
nmm 5.457 5.429 5.227 5.225 5.246 5.148 5.178 5.255 5.054 5.125 5.267
i_s 11.492 11.451 11.071 11.067 11.108 10.915 10.971 11.120 10.721 10.860 11.140
nfm 0.663 0.669 0.555 0.554 0.565 0.512 0.526 0.565 0.463 0.494 0.565
ele 0.154 0.161 0.140 0.140 0.142 0.132 0.135 0.142 0.123 0.129 0.142
omf 48.063 47.549 47.558 47.560 47.557 47.580 47.546 47.531 47.617 47.548 47.513
TRN 23.296 24.102 24.044 24.053 24.031 23.999 23.831 23.747 23.928 23.476 23.316
AOG 32.623 32.349 32.572 32.574 32.554 32.672 32.641 32.565 32.801 32.727 32.582
10% 15% 20%
 
Source: Author’s computations 
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Table 5.23: Commodity import volumes of Turkey 
(billion 2004 USD) 
TUR 2020 NOACT NP_rET
S
P_rETS EU_ETS NP_rET
S
P_rETS EU_ETS NP_rET
S
P_rETS EU_ETS
oil 2.179 2.186 2.146 2.147 2.148 2.127 2.118 2.123 2.101 2.077 2.087
gas 2.848 2.866 2.758 2.758 2.767 2.704 2.704 2.738 2.633 2.635 2.699
omn 0.680 0.677 0.668 0.667 0.668 0.664 0.665 0.669 0.659 0.663 0.670
tex 8.524 8.493 8.493 8.493 8.493 8.492 8.494 8.494 8.490 8.495 8.496
ppp 2.811 2.803 2.820 2.820 2.818 2.826 2.824 2.816 2.835 2.827 2.813
crp 27.737 27.661 27.879 27.881 27.857 27.972 27.938 27.847 28.091 28.004 27.834
nmm 0.864 0.856 0.893 0.894 0.890 0.909 0.903 0.889 0.928 0.914 0.887
i_s 13.712 13.616 13.713 13.714 13.704 13.756 13.741 13.702 13.812 13.774 13.702
nfm 12.032 11.948 12.103 12.105 12.090 12.168 12.145 12.089 12.249 12.195 12.090
ele 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.016
omf 58.171 58.318 58.194 58.192 58.203 58.126 58.162 58.209 58.032 58.115 58.209
COL 1.062 1.084 0.673 0.672 0.693 0.573 0.576 0.645 0.479 0.487 0.603
CRU 4.709 4.738 4.655 4.656 4.659 4.615 4.596 4.608 4.561 4.511 4.532
TRN 3.118 3.064 3.060 3.059 3.062 3.059 3.074 3.084 3.059 3.100 3.119
AOG 13.095 13.146 13.050 13.049 13.057 13.006 13.021 13.052 12.949 12.983 13.043
10% 15% 20%
 
Source: Author’s computations 
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Table 5.24: Carbon intensity, CO2 / GDP  
(Mt CO2 per 2004 USD) 
10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20%
Turkey 0.426 0.428 0.355 0.336 0.317 0.355 0.336 0.317 0.359 0.349 0.339
EU 0.23529 0.20019 0.20019 0.20019 0.20019 0.20019 0.20019 0.20019 0.20008 0.19980 0.19951
NP_rETS P_rETS EU_ETS
NOACT2020
 
Source: Author’s computations 
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  CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and Future Directions 
This chapter identifies the main findings of this dissertation and 
interprets on how they suit to the current environmental policy agenda 
regarding the design of the post-2012 mitigation efforts. The chapter further 
concludes with feasible paths for future research.  
The economic impacts of Turkey’s collaboration with the international 
community in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions over the post-Kyoto 
period are studied in this dissertation. In regard to the possible abatement 
strategies, the current research mainly focused on the use of market-based 
instruments, i.e. cap-and-trade systems. As the design of a cap-and-trade 
system has many critical aspects, in this study, four main dimensions are 
identified and analyzed, i.e. total cutback requirement, regional permit 
trading in a segmented and a comprehensive market structure, and direct 
linkage with the EU ETS market.  
 In studying the aforementioned policy issues, I utilized a multi-country 
general equilibrium framework which clearly identified the interregional 
linkages via commodity and permit trading. As a result of policy 
simulations, it is seen that in case of a nationwide cap-and-trade system, 
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Turkey suffers from economic losses, which is mainly due to the increasing 
marginal costs of production. Segmented permit trading schemes result in 
larger welfare losses compared to comprehensive schemes. As the cutback 
ratio increases in a segmented scheme, due to the high permit price 
differentials, cost efficiency further decreases and economic loss gets bigger 
in comparison to comprehensive markets. In case of linking national ETS 
sectors with the EU ETS, regardless of the total cap, Turkey is definitely 
better off compared to nationwide trading scheme. Due to its highly carbon 
intensive economy, Turkey finds it more expensive to abate at home than to 
shift some of its abatement duties to the EU via permit trading in the EU 
ETS. Hence, in terms of economic efficiency, cooperation with the EU in 
mitigation efforts has certain advantages for Turkey. 
As the analysis shows, the European Union has economic benefits out of 
Turkey’s domestic mitigation actions due to increased competitiveness of 
European industries in the world markets. This is further accompanied by 
environmental efficiency gains stemming from the decrease in CO2 leakage. 
However, the net economic effects of a potential linkage between Turkey’s 
national ETS scheme with the EU ETS highly depend on the design 
parameters of Turkey’s permit trading scheme. In case of a direct linkage, the 
amount of abatement burden that the EU is supposed to carry is highly 
dependent on Turkey’s mitigation target. As the analysis shows, the EU ends 
up suffering more from increasing output losses with the increase in 
Turkey’s mitigation target. Hence, the question of how much burden that the 
Turkish authorities will put on the ETS sectors is highly critical and open to 
controversies.  
As this study mainly focuses on economic impacts of the use of various 
forms of cap-and-trade systems, it definitely is not enough to set any kind of 
environmental regulation just based on economic criteria. Environmental 
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quality is also a critical aspect of any kind of environmental policy 
architecture, which is generally hard to quantify, and hence, to include in 
cost and benefit analyses. The current analysis shows the necessity of taking 
environmental quality into account, as it is possible to have environmental 
degradation and economic well-being go in opposite directions. Hence, a 
possible extension of the current setup is to extend the cost and benefit 
analysis in a way including environmental degradation. The main difficulty 
with this approach is to quantify environmental degradation and the related 
disutility out of it.    
In addition to the promotion of widespread use of market-based 
instruments, post-2012 mitigation strategies also promote the electricity 
generation from renewable energy sources. The European Union has already 
set its target as 20% share of renewable energy sources in final energy 
consumption and each member state has a corresponding target in line with 
the overall target (European Commission 2008). The promotion of renewable 
energy sources in Turkey is also critical for diversification of energy supply, 
increasing security, environmental protection and economic benefits in the 
long run. Hence, extending the MR-ETPA model to the use of renewable 
energy sources in electricity generation would certainly add much to the 
current analysis. It is possible to do this extension within the current setup of 
the model using autonomous energy efficiency indices. However, adding 
endogenous technology improvement into the current setup will give further 
insights regarding the transitional dynamics of the economies and open the 
question of how to finance the presumed technological change. Hence, in 
such kind of setup, it will also be possible to analyze the ways and effects of 
revenue recycling. 
Another possible extension is to investigate the potential economic 
impacts of the current environmental policy agenda under the benefits of 
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free flows of labor and capital that come with a full membership to the 
European Union. Ellerman (2009) states that “club benefits” are actually the 
essence underlying the expansion of the EU ETS from the initial fifteen 
member states to the thirty member states currently. Thus, it is worthwhile 
to analyze how large the so-called club benefits can get in case of Turkey’s 
accession and whether that can give incentives to both parties for setting 
more ambitious environmental targets.  
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 The GTAP 7 Data Base  APPENDIX A
Table A.1: Sets (indices) 
Name Description
i  (alias j )      Set of tradable commodities and sectors
r  (alias s )     Set of regions
f   (alias ff )    Set of endowment commodities
g
Superset including the set of tradable commodities
and sectors - i , final consumption composite (“c ”), 
investment composite (“i ”) and public good
composite (“g ”)
 
 
Table A.2: Tax parameters 
Name Dimension Description
rto g x r Output taxes (gross basis)
rtf f x i x r Factor taxes (net basis)
rtfd i x g x r Intermediate input taxes on domestic supply (net basis)
rtfi i x g x r Intermediate input taxes on imports (net basis)
rtxs i x r x s Export subsidies (net basis)
rtms i x r x s Import tariffs (net basis)
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Table A.3: Data arrays in the GTAP 7 data file 
Name Dimension Description
EVFA f x g x r Primary factor purchases, at agents’ prices
EVOM f x r Aggregate factor endowment, at market prices
VOM g x r Total domestic supply, at market prices
VDFA i x g x r Domestic purchases, by agents, at agents’ prices
VDFM i x g x r Domestic purchases, by agents, at market prices
VFM f x g x r Primary factor purchases, at market prices
VIFA i x g x r Import purchases, by agents, at agents’ prices
VIFM i x g x r Import purchases, by agents, at market prices
VIMS i x r x s Imports, at market prices
VIWS i x r x s Imports, at world prices
VIM i x r Aggregate imports, at market prices
VST i x r Margin exports
VTWR j x i x r x s Margins by margin commodity
VXMD i x r x s Non-margin exports, at market prices
VXWD i x r x s Non-margin exports, at world prices
VXM i x r Aggregate non-margin exports, at market prices
ECO2 i x g x r Volume of CO2 emissions (Gg)
EVD i x g x r Volume of energy demand (mtoe)
EVT i x g x r Volume of energy trade (mtoe)
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 Mappings for Data Aggregation APPENDIX B
A full list of sectors, regions and factors in the GTAP 7 data base can be 
found in (Badri & Walmsley 2008). 
Table B.1: Sector aggregations in the MR-ETPA model 
GTAP 
Label Description
GTAP 
Label Description
oil Refined oil products ppp Paper products
col Coal nmm Non-metalic minerals
cru Crude oil crp Chemicals 
ele Electricity nfm Non-ferreous metals
i_s Iron and steel products omn Mining
gas Natural gas gdt Natural gas manufacturing and distribution
tex Textiles lea Leather products
wap Wearing apparel
fmp Fabricated metal products otn Transport equipment
mvh Motor vehicles eeq Electronic equipment
ome Other machinery omf Other manufacturing
otp Land transport atp Air transport
wtp Water transport
All Other Sectors (aog)
 Non-Aggregated Sectors
Natural Gas (gas)
Textiles - Wearing Apparel - Leather (tex)
Other Manufacturing Industries (omf)
Transport (trn)
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Table B.2: Region aggregations in the MR-ETPA model 
GTAP 
Label
Description
GTAP 
Label
Description
TUR Turkey
AUT Austria GBR United Kingdom
BEL Belgium BGR Bulgaria
DNK Denmark CYP Cyprus
FIN Finland CZE Czech Republic
FRA France EST Estonia
DEU Germany HUN Hungary
GRC Greece LVA Latvia
IRL Ireland LTU Lithuania
ITA Italy MLT Malta
LUX Luxembourg POL Poland
NLD Netherlands ROU Romania
PRT Portugal SVK Slovakia
ESP Spain SVN Slovenia
SWE Sweden
 Non-Aggregated Regions
European Union (EU)
Rest of the World (ROW)
 
 
Table B.3: Factor aggregations in the MR-ETPA model 
GTAP 
Label
Description
GTAP 
Label
Description
CAP Capital
SKL Skilled Labor LAB Unskilled Labor
RES Resources LND Land
 Non-Aggregated Factors
Labor (LAB)
Resources (RES)
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 Trade Flows in the GTAP 7 Data Base APPENDIX C
C.1 Turkey 
 
Figure C.1: Import profile of Turkey from the European Union 
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Figure C.2: Import profile of Turkey from the Rest of the World 
 
 
 
FigureC.3: Export profile of Turkey to the European Union 
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Figure C.4: Export profile of Turkey to the Rest of the World 
 
C.2 The European Union 
 
Figure C.5: Import profile of the European Union from Turkey  
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Figure C.6: Import profile of the European Union from the Rest of the 
World  
 
 
 
Figure C.7: Export profile of the European Union to Turkey 
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Figure C.8: Export profile of the European Union to the Rest of the World 
 
C.3 The Rest of the World 
 
Figure C.9: Import profile of the Rest of the World from Turkey  
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Figure C.10: Import profile of the Rest of the World from the European 
Union  
 
 
Figure C.11: Export profile of the Rest of the World to Turkey 
 
oil
2%
gas
0%
omn
1%
tex
4%
ppp
2%
crp
14% nmm
1% i_s
2%nfm
1%
ele
0%
omf
41%COL
0%
CRU
0%
TRN
6%
AOG
26%
Imports of the ROW from the EU
oil
4%
gas
6% omn
0% tex
6%
ppp
1%
crp
11%
nmm
0%i_s
9%
nfm
9%
ele
0%
omf
24%
COL
2%
CRU
13%
TRN
4% AOG
11%
Exports of the ROW to Turkey
  
149 
 
 
Figure C.12: Export profile of the Rest of the World to the European Union 
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